Common Law Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit, and Consent Judgments: The Analytical Challenge by Pearson, Katherine C.
Penn State Dickinson Law 
Dickinson Law IDEAS 
Faculty Scholarly Works Faculty Scholarship 
Winter 1999 
Common Law Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit, and Consent 
Judgments: The Analytical Challenge 
Katherine C. Pearson 
kcp4@psu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/fac-works 
Recommended Citation 
Katherine C. Pearson, Common Law Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit, and Consent Judgments: The 
Analytical Challenge, 48 Cath. U. L. Rev. 419 (1999). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarly Works by an authorized administrator of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For 
more information, please contact lja10@psu.edu. 
COMMON LAW PRECLUSION, FULL FAITH
AND CREDIT, AND CONSENT JUDGMENTS:
THE ANALYTICAL CHALLENGE
Katherine C. Pearson*
"A doctrine that a judgment is binding ... does nothing to delineate its
scope. There remains the question of what issues, and what persons, are
concluded or bound."
-Professor Ronan E. Degnan.'
"[Y]ou're trying to make this applicable to Baker, and Baker is simply
not bound."
-Justice Anthony M. Kennedy.
2
I. INTRODUCTION
The Constitution provides that "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every
other State."3 The phrase "judicial proceedings" has become a term of
legal art, meaning "final judgments., 4 The law regarding full faith and
credit has developed largely in the context of litigated final judgments;'
*Assistant Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State
University. I am grateful especially to Matthew J. Kloiber ('99) and Michelle M. Bassano
('99) for their excellent research assistance and to Dean Peter G. Glenn for his timely
guidance and inspiration.
1. Ronan E. Degnan, Federalized Res Judicata, 85 YALE L.J. 741,756 (1976).
2. United States Supreme Court Official Transcript at 30, Baker v. General Motors
Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998) (No. 96-653) [hereinafter Transcript], available in 1997 WL
638425 at *30; see also id. at 7-8 (Kennedy, J.) (declaring that the Bakers were not bound
by the Michigan decree).
3. U.S. CONST. art. IV, sec. 1; see 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994) (requiring state and fed-
eral courts to give state judicial proceedings "the same full faith and credit" as those pro-
ceedings would be given in the jurisdiction where they occurred).
4. EUGENE F. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 24.8, at 963 (2d ed.
1992) ("The Full Faith and Credit Clause refers to 'judicial proceedings' and, on its face,
does not require 'finality' in a foreign decree as condition of enforcement.... However, it
is generally assumed that recognition, in the interstate setting, is constitutionally required
only for final decrees and judgments." (footnote ommitted)).
5. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (applying rules of collateral estop-
pel that prevent relitigation of search and seizure issue resolved in state criminal case);
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 286 (1980) (holding that full faith and
credit did not bar additional workers' compensation award); Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106,
116 (1963) (holding that a judgment determining land ownership is entitled to full faith
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most lawsuits, however, are resolved by settlements, and frequently these
settlements involve documentation in the form of consent decrees or
stipulated judgments. In reality, such judgments are often little more
than the parties' contracts, rubber-stamped by the court.6 How are such
"consent judgments"7 to be treated for purposes of full faith and credit
when they impact on important interests of persons who are not parties
to the settlement?
Recently, in Baker v. General Motors Corp. 8 the Supreme Court was
asked whether a consent judgment entered by a Michigan state court
must be given full faith and credit by a federal court in Missouri. The or-
der in question was written by the parties in 1992 as part of the settle-
ment of a Michigan suit between General Motors ("GM") and Ronald
Elwell ("Elwell"), its former employee. In the settlement, Elwell was
paid money and he agreed to an order that prohibited him from testify-
ing in future product liability cases against GM.9 In 1994, the Bakers
subpoenaed Elwell in their products liability suit in Missouri to testify
and credit, even as to the question of jurisdiction that had been fully litigated in the first
proceeding in the matter); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 14 (1909) (denying the transfer of title
to land ordered by an out-of-state judgment because full faith and credit did not require
enforcement); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237-38 (1908) (holding that full faith and
credit must be given to the judgment of another state notwithstanding any errors of law,
and despite the fact that the underlying cause of action was prohibited in the second state).
But see Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 212-13 (1933) (holding that the first
judgment, a consent decree arising out of the parties' settlement of their divorce, created a
bar to child's second suit for support). Interestingly, Yarborough is as much known for
Justice Stone's dissent, that would not have applied full faith and credit, as for the majority
decision that did. See id. at 213-17 (Stone, J., dissenting).
6. A less disturbing, or more politically sensitive, description of the court's role is to
refer to the entry of a consent judgment as a "'mere ministerial act.'" Judith Resnik,
Judging Consent, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 54 (quoting 49 C.J.S., Judgments § 176, at 312
(1947)).
7. The phrase "consent judgments," will be used in this Article to refer to a wide
variety of consensually created documents used by parties to settle their cases using a
court order. See Fleming James, Jr., Consent Judgments as Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA.
L. REv. 173, 178 (1959) (stating that "[c]onsent judgments are by no means all alike"); see
also 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4443, at
383 (1981) ("Consent judgments... may assume forms that range from simple orders of
dismissal with or without prejudice to detailed decrees. Whatever form is taken, the cen-
tral characteristic is that the court has not actually resolved the substance of the issues pre-
sented." (footnote ommitted)). Final judgments, arising from the court's action in adjudi-
cating the case by summary judgment or trial, including those which order injunctive
relief, will be referred to herein as "litigated judgments."
8. 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998).
9. The agreed order was phrased in terms of a "permanent injunction" that enjoined
Elwell from "'testifying, without the prior written consent of General Motors Corporation
... as an expert witness, or as a witness of any kind."' Id. at 661 (quoting Order Dismiss-
ing Plaintiff's Complaint and Granting Permanent Injunction entered on August 26, 1992).
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against GM, thus triggering questions about the effect of the Michigan
order. ° GM asserted that enforcement of the consent judgment was
mandated by the Full Faith and Credit Clause and its statutory ana-
logue," thereby prohibiting any testimony by Elwell.
During appellate proceedings on the question of whether Missouri
must recognize the Michigan order, the case attracted the attention of
people outraged by the idea that GM might be able to "buy" the silence
of a so-called whistleblower using the assistance of the court." The case
also drew the attention of people on both sides of the gay rights move-
ment concerned with same-sex marriage issues, who hoped the Supreme
Court would use this occasion to clarify whether public policy exceptions
to full faith and credit would be recognized. 3 Adding further interest to
10. The effect of the Elwell consent judgment also was addressed in several other
product liability claims against GM. See, e.g., Hannah v. General Motors Corp., 969 F.
Supp. 554, 560-61 (D. Ariz. 1996) (postponing ruling on full faith and credit issue to permit
petitioner to seek modification of injunction); Ake v. General Motors Corp., 942 F. Supp.
869, 880-81 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) (refusing to enforce consent judgment because of public
policy); Bishop v. General Motors Corp., No. 94-286-S, 1994 WL 910817, at *2 (E.D. Okla.
1994) (denying full faith and credit to injuction that violates state and federal policy of full
discovery); Williams v. General Motors Corp., 147 F.R.D. 270, 273 (S.D. Ga. 1993) (de-
nying enforcement of consent judgment because of public policy); Smith v. Superior
Court, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 20, 21 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (refusing to enforce consent judgment
because of California public policy); Ruskin v. General Motors Corp., No. CV 93 0073883,
1995 WL 41399, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 25, 1995) (denying full faith and credit be-
cause blanket prohibition of testimony violates Connecticut public policy); Meenach v.
General Motors Corp., 891 S.W.2d 398, 402-03 (Ky. 1995) (holding that the Kentucky
Court may modify the injunction and allow Elwell to testify in the public interest of full
discovery).
11. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
12. See Brief of Amicus Curiae', The Association of Trial Lawyers of America, in
Support of Petitioners at 9-10, Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998) (No.
96-653), available in 1997 WL 280220 (arguing that preventing testimony of a knowledge-
able witness undermines the judicial system of Missouri by preventing the state from con-
ducting a full inquiry into a dangerous product); Brief of Amicus Curiae, Center for Auto
Safety, in Support of Petitioners at 3-11, Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S.Ct. 657
(1998) (No. 96-653), available in 1997 WL 280222 (stressing the potential for wide-ranging
effect of the decision on whistleblower evidence); see also Smith, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 26
(finding that the ElwelIIGM consent judgment equates to buying Elwell's silence and
analogizing such a purchase to the felonious act of bribing a potential witness).
13. See, e.g., David G. Savage, Combustible Cases: Will a Car Crash Ruling Lead to
Recognition of Gay Marriage?, A.B.A. J. March 1998, at 42. Compare Brief of Amici Cu-
riae, States of Ohio, Colorado, Utah and the Commonwealth of Virginia, in Support of
Respondent at 3-6, Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998) (No. 96-653),
available in 1997 WL 414365 (arguing that full faith and credit requires other states to en-
force the Michigan injunction regardless of whether the judgment is in conflict with the
policies of the laws of the forum state, because permitting states to develop local excep-
tions would undermine the federal system of government), with Brief of Amici Curiae,
States of Missouri, Connecticut, Iowa, Mississippi, Washington, Wisconsin and the Com-
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
the case, Harvard law professor and constitutional scholar, Laurence
Tribe, handled the oral argument on behalf of the Bakers.4 Professor
Tribe urged the Court to deny enforcement of the Michigan consent de-
cree on the basis of due process, an important argument that was none-
theless avoided by the Court," even as it ruled in favor of the Bakers.
In the decision of Baker v. General Motors, Justice Ruth Bader Gins-
burg, writing for the majority of the justices, sought to reaffirm the im-
portance of full faith and credit jurisprudence mandating interjurisdic-
tional enforcenient of final judgments and to confirm that injunctive
16relief is included within the scope of this constitutional principle. None-
theless, she refused to require the Missouri federal court to enforce the
Michigan judgment, a position on which the Supreme Court was unani-
mous. 7 The decision articulated an unexpected rationale 8 by which the
Missouri court was justified in refusing to honor the Michigan court's fi-
nal order. The court said the following:
A final judgment in one State, if rendered by a court with
adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and persons gov-
erned by the judgment, qualifies for recognition throughout the
land....
monwealth of Massachusetts, in Support of Petitioners at 1-3, Baker v. General Motors
Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998) (No. 96-653), available in 1997 WL 280223 (arguing that the
principles of federalism enshrined in full faith and credit "do not override fundamental
due process" and that the Bakers, as absent parties to the Elwell dispute, may not be pre-
cluded from obtaining "every man's testimony" as required by Missouri public policy).
14. Also indicating the high stakes involved, GM was represented in oral argument
before the Eighth Circuit by former federal circuit court judge, Kenneth W. Starr, at a
time when his attentions were not yet fully engaged by his role as independent counsel in-
vestigating President Clinton. "Starr, who earned more than $1.1 million in private legal
work last year [1996] even while serving as independent counsel, has decided not to argue
the case [before the Supreme Court] himself because of his workload, according to
[Kirkland & Ellis] law firm partner Paul Cappuccio, who will argue instead." Tony
Mauro, GM's "Whistle-Blower" Case, USA TODAY, Oct. 6,1997, at 14A.
15. See discussion infra Part V (focusing on the implications of Baker and the Court's
avoidance of the due process issue).
16. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 663-65 (1998) ("The Court has
never placed equity decrees outside the full faith and credit domain .... We see no reason
why the preclusive effects of an adjudication ... should differ depending solely upon the
type of relief sought in a civil action.").
17. Justice Ginsburg's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Stevens, Souter, and Breyer. Justice Scalia wrote a short opinion concurring in the judg-
ment. See id. at 668. Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment, which
is critical of the analysis used by Ginsburg. His concurrence was joined by Justices
O'Connor and Thomas. See id.
18. See id. at 669 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The exceptions the majority recognizes
are neither consistent with its rejection of a public policy exception to full faith and credit
nor in accord with established rules implementing the Full Faith and Credit Clause.").
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Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States
must adopt the practices of other States regarding the time,
manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforce-
ment measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as
preclusive effects do; such measures remain subject to the even-
handed control of forum law....
Michigan's judgment ...cannot reach beyond the Elwell-
GM controversy to control proceedings against GM brought in
other States, by other parties, asserting claims the merits of
which Michigan has not considered)9
The Court's decision identifies limitations on "the authority of one
State's court to order that a witness' testimony shall not be heard in any
court of the United States., 2 As such, the decision applies to both liti-
gated and consent judgments, and can be viewed as recognizing an im-
portant exception to the often lauded importance of the Full Faith and
Credit Clause as a mandate for interjurisdictional finality of judgments. 2,
Despite Justice Ginsburg's strongly asserted rejection of public policy as
a basis for avoiding the full faith and credit command,22 the decision itself
appears to coincide with the theory expressed in section 103, a controver-
sial public policy-based exception, described in the Restatement (Second)
of Conflict of Laws.23
In an era of complex public interest suits, often involving class actions
and covering the spectrum from individual civil rights to global environ-
mental issues, the Baker decision potentially impacts the daily work of
24
litigators and scholars. Consent judgments, properly drawn, have
19. Id. at 663-66.
20. Id. at 660.
21. Justice Kennedy criticized this aspect of the decision. See id. at 669 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("As employed to resolve this case, furthermore, the exceptions [recognized
by the majority] to full faith and credit have a potential for disrupting judgments, and this
ought to give us considerable pause.").
22. See id. at 664, 667 (arguing that case law does not support a public policy excep-
tion).
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 103 (1969) [hereinafter
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS] (setting forth the proposition that "[a] judg-
ment rendered in one State of the United States need not be recognized or enforced in a
sister State if such recognition or enforcement is not required by the national policy of full
faith and credit because it would involve an improper interference with important interests
of the sister State").
24. There is no single definition for "consent judgments," nor is there universal un-
derstanding of what is meant by the similar terms "stipulated judgments," "consent de-
crees," or "joint final orders." The common factors are the agreement of the parties and
some measure of "approval" by the court. See Douglas Laycock, Consent Decrees Without
Consent: The Rights of Nonconsenting Third Parties, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 103 ("A con-
sent decree is simply a settlement that includes an injunction."). Some states have
1999]
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proven to be useful tools in the management of such multi-party and
multi-jurisdictional litigation, and both "liberal" and "conservative" in-
terests have something to gain-or lose-from broad enforcement of
such decrees. When crafting consent judgments, practicing lawyers will
need to understand the third party effects of such agreements. Similarly
for scholars, the decision provides additional insight into the jurispru-
dence of a conservative Supreme Court that seems willing to set limits on
one court's ability to control proceedings in another jurisdiction, but is
reluctant to do so on any basis that implies "new" individual rights.26
And, as will be demonstrated in this Article, for both practitioners and
theorists, the decision in Baker is as important for what it does not say as
for what it does say about third party concerns in consent judgments.
The Article begins with an overview of the Baker case,27 including a
discussion of facts and issues not directly addressed by the Supreme
Court, but that are important to an understanding of its ruling.28 The Ar-
ticle then identifies key analytical approaches that were articulated dur-
ing the protracted course of Baker v. General Motors.29 Following a brief
review of basic principles of preclusion3" and a note of caution about their
application to consent judgments,3" this Article undertakes examination
adopted rules governing consent judgments, such as CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 664.6 (West
1987 & Supp. 1998) (governing the entry of judgment by agreement). Some other areas of
the law have created a specific role for the court in "approving" a settlement or respond-
ing to a challenge, as in FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (stating that "[a] class action shall not be...
compromised without the approval of the court") and 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(n) (1994 &
West Supp. 1998) (governing challenges to employment practices set by consent judg-
ments). However, this Article is concerned primarily with the largely undefined and un-
regulated practice of asking the court to sign a final order, the terms of which were dic-
tated by the parties.
25. Compare Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 768-69 (1989) (refusing to treat a consent
decree settling black firefighters' employment suit as a bar to white firefighters' claims re-
garding unfair treatment), with Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369
(1996) (permitting a consent decree to resolve shareholder claims beyond the scope of the
state court's specific jurisdiction, and despite objections raised by federal case class mem-
bers).
26. See discussion infra Part V.C (focusing on the fact that the Court "side-stepped"
the due process issue argued by Professor Tribe).
27. See discussion infra Part II (analyzing the background of Baker).
28. See discussion infra Part II.A (discussing specifically the background of Ronald
Elwell's consent judgment in Michigan).
29. See discussion infra Part II.B (focusing specifically on the history of the Bakers'
case).
30. See discussion infra Part III.A & B (discussing interjurisdictional principles, spe-
cifically, the common law rule of preclusion).
31. See discussion infra Part III.C (warning that interjurisdictional preclusion princi-
ples applied to consent judgments may give rise to specific fairness concerns).
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of Justice Ginsburg's important majority decision. 2 The concluding sec-
tions of this Article analyze the reasons for her departure from the major
theories advanced by the parties and the implications of Baker for future
questions of interjurisdictional enforcement of judgments, whether liti-
gated or consensual." In closing, this Article suggests the need for a
clearer statement of the law governing-or limiting-preclusion by con-
sent judgments.
II. BACKGROUND
An analysis of a "full faith and credit" enforcement issue requires an
understanding of common law preclusion principles. In order to respond
to the major holdings in Baker, it is helpful to review certain basic legal
principles;35 however, to put these principles into context, this Article
first will explore the factual and legal setting of Baker.
A. The Michigan Consent Judgment
Ronald Elwell began his employment with GM in 1959. In 1971, he
was assigned to an engineering analytical team, and his particular work
focused on fuel systems and fuel-fed fires. In this capacity he suggested
changes in GM fuel line designs and conducted analyses of GM vehicle
fires.36 As part of his work, he consulted with GM legal staff and outside
counsel who were preparing defenses for product liability suits.3 7 On be-
half of GM, he testified both as a factual witness and as an expert wit-
ness, and assisted in preparation for litigation, including answering dis-
covery requests. GM identified Elwell on multiple occasions as its expert
witness on fuel systems in response to discovery under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 30(b)(6)."' Despite his long-term role as a company man,
his relationship with GM deteriorated, eventually to the point where
both parties were dissatisfied.
In 1991, Elwell filed suit against GM in Michigan state court, alleging
32. See discussion infra Part IV (focusing on Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion).
33. See discussion infra Part V.A-C (discussing the implications of Justice Ginsburg's
and Justice Kennedy's opinions).
34. See discussion infra Part VI (concluding that limitations exist on interjuridictional
effects of judgments).
35. See discussion infra Part III (describing the basic interjurisdictional preclusion
principles).
36. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 660-61 (1998); see Brief for
Petitioners at 4, Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998) (No. 96-653) [here-
inafter Petitioner's Brief], available in 1997 WL 278921.
37. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 661; Petitioner's Brief, supranote 36, at 4.
38. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 4-5.
1999]
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wrongful discharge and other tort and contract claims; GM counter-
claimed, alleging breach of fiduciary duty arising from alleged disclosure
of privileged and confidential information and misappropriation of pro-
prietary documents.39 Upon motion by GM, the Michigan court held a
hearing and issued a preliminary injunction, enjoining Elwell from "con-
sulting or discussing with or disclosing to any person any of General Mo-
tors Corporation's trade secrets[,] confidential information or matters of
attorney-client work product relating in any manner to the subject matter
of any products liability litigation whether already filed or [ ] filed in the
future."40 However, the court denied GM's request that Elwell be barred
from giving any testimony whatsoever about GM products.41
Elwell and GM eventually entered into a settlement of all claims in
August 1992, with Elwell accepting an undisclosed sum of money. As
part of the settlement, three documents were created. One document was
an agreed or stipulated "permanent injunction" that prohibited Elwell
from giving virtually any testimony in litigation involving GM.4' The
Michigan state court signed this stipulated final injunction without mak-
41ing any changes. "A judge new to the case, not the judge who con-
ducted a hearing at the preliminary injunction stage, presided at the set-
tlement stage and entered the permanent injunction."44 This document is
the consent judgment under consideration in the Baker case and in other
product liability claims against GM.
The second document created by the settlement consisted of a series of
39. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 661; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 5.
40. Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 661 (citation omitted); Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 5-6.
41. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 661; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 6.
42. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 661; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 6. The injunction
specifically prohibited Elwell from
(1) consulting or discussing with or disclosing to any counsel or other attorney or
person any of General Motors Corporation's trade secrets, confidential informa-
tion or matters of attorney-client privilege or attorney-client work product relat-
ing in any manner to the subject matter of any litigation, whether already filed or
filed in the future, which Ronald E. Elwell received or had knowledge of during
his employment with General Motors Corporation; and (2) testifying, without the
prior written consent of General Motors Corporation, either upon deposition or
at trial as an expert witness, or a witness of any kind, and from consulting with at-
torneys or their agents in any litigation already filed or to be filed in the future,
involving General Motors Corporation as an owner, seller, manufacturer and/or
designer of the product(s) in issue. Provided, however, paragraph (2) of the Or-
der shall not operate to interfere with the jurisdiction of the Court in the Georgia
case referred to in the Stipulation.
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 6.
43. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 661 ("On August 26, 1992, with no further hearing, the
Michigan court entered the injunction precisely as tendered by the parties.").
44. Id. at 661 n.1.
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"stipulations" signed by Elwell and a representative of GM. The stipula-
tions provided, among other things, that "[b]ecause of [Elwell's past]
working relationship with GM's Legal Staff and outside counsel, de-
pending on the subject matter, it is extremely difficult for Elwell to de-
termine whether his knowledge with respect to GM only comes from at-
torney-client and work product communications or from non-privileged
communications."45 These stipulations were made part of the record in
the Michigan court, and appeared to be GM's explanation for a complete
ban on Elwell's testimony. The stipulations did not, however, require
any judicial approval.46
By the third document, a separate "settlement agreement," the parties
further agreed that Elwell could testify if ordered to do so by a court or
other tribunal: "'[Elwell's] appearance and testimony ... if the Court or
other tribunal so orders, will in no way form a basis for an action in viola-
tion of the Permanent Injunction or this Agreement.' 47 According to
the parties, the full terms of this settlement agreement are unavailable to
the public because this document was "sealed" by the Michigan court,
although it is unclear from the record upon what basis the sealing was
48necessary.
Before the settlement, Elwell had already testified at a deposition in
the Georgia action specifically referred to in the injunction, regarding
what he contended was an inferior fuel system in a GM pickup; the same
fuel system he had defended in other cases. The settlement agreement
expressly permitted Elwell to testify in the Georgia trial.4'9 However, be-
45. See Stipulation, Elwell v. General Motors Corp., No. 91-15946 (Mich. Cir. Ct.,
Apr. 16, 1993) [hereinafter Stipulations], reprinted in Joint Appendix at 13, Baker v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998).
46. In its briefing to the Supreme Court, GM claimed that as part of the settlement,
GM and Elwell agreed to factual stipulations, including Elwell's specific acknowledgment
"that his close working relationship with General Motors' lawyers permeates everything
he learned during his employment," thus establishing that it was virtually impossible for
him to testify without violation of some privilege. Brief for Respondent at 5, Baker v.
General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998) (No. 96-653) [hereinafter Respondent's
Brief], available in 1997 WL 413160.
47. Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 662 (quoting Settlement Agreement).
48. See Brief of Appellees, Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 1 n.1, Baker v. General
Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 1996). As was observed by former United States Dis-
trict Court Judge Prentice H. Marshall (N.D. Ill. 1973-96), based on his experience with
so-called protective orders stipulated by parties, "[i]f litigants want their disputes resolved
by the judiciary, the resolution should be done publicly." Prentice H. Marshall, Letter to
the Editor, A.B.A. J., June 1998, at 10.
49. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 661. In the products liability case referred to in the El-
well/GM settlement, Moseley v. General Motors Corp., 447 S.E.2d 302, 305 (Ga. Ct. App.
1994), abrogated by Webster v. Boyett, 496 S.E.2d 459 (Ga. 1998), the jury, following sanc-
1999]
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tween 1992 and 1997, Elwell was subpoenaed to testify in numerous addi-
tional cases against GM across the country, resulting in varying rulings
on the effect of the Michigan consent judgment."
B. The Lower Courts' Rulings
The Bakers' case, filed in 1991, was a wrongful death suit arising out of
the death of Beverly Garner, a 29-year-old passenger in a 1985 Chevrolet
S-10 Blazer, in a 1990 highway accident.51 The Bakers alleged that the
Blazer's electric fuel pump was faulty, with no adequate mechanism to
prevent gas from entering the engine compartment when a collision oc-
curs, contributing to a fire that killed their mother and the driver of the
vehicle.52 The suit was filed in Missouri state court and was removed by
GM to the federal district court in Missouri on the basis of diversity. 3
GM denied the allegations of product fault and alleged that impact-
injuries from the collision caused by the other driver's negligence were
the cause of Garner's death5 4  The Bakers sought to depose Elwell,
which GM opposed on the basis of the Michigan injunction. In an un-
published order, the federal district court ruled that public policy pre-
vented enforcement of the consent judgment.55 The district court noted
that Missouri's public policy was embodied in the Missouri Rules of Civil
Procedure and favored full disclosure of all non-privileged, relevant in-
formation."
tions for discovery abuses entered against GM, awarded $4.24 million in compensatory
damages and $101 million in punitive damages. The verdict was appealed and the Georgia
Court of Appeals reversed the judgment because of improperly admitted evidence of
other accidents. See id. at 313. The Moseley suit was settled, along with three other GM
product suits, in September 1995 for a "confidential" sum. Jim Cahoy, GM Settles Pickup-
Truck Lawsuits After Judge Bars Defense Exhibits from Trial, WEST'S LEGAL NEWS, Sept.
13, 1995, available in 1995 WL 909466.
50. See supra note 10 (citing cases addressing the interpretation of the Elwell/GM
consent judgment in other product liability claims against GM).
51. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 662; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 2; Respondent's
Brief, supra note 46, at 2.
52. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 662; Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 2-3.
53. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 662; Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 3; Respondent's
Brief, supra note 46, at 2.
54. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 662; Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 3.
55. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 662. The district court held, "Michigan's injunction need
not be enforced because blocking Elwell's testimony would violate Missouri's 'public pol-
icy,' which shielded from disclosure only privileged or otherwise confidential informa-
tion." Id.
56. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811, 819 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118 S.
Ct. 657 (1998) (discussing the district court opinion). The Michigan order, which did not
differentiate between privileged and non-privileged information, was characterized as in-
consistent with Missouri public policy. See id.
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In a separate ruling, the district court also imposed significant sanc-
tions against GM for failing to disclose information during discovery, or-
dered that GM's affirmative defenses be stricken, and further instructed
the jury that the fuel pump in question "was defective" and that "Gen-
eral Motors ha[d] been aware of this defect and hazard for many years."57
These rulings, combined with Elwell's testimony that the defect contrib-
uted to the fire in question, undoubtedly affected the jury's finding of
causation and award of $11.3 million in damages.
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment,58 in pertinent
part finding that the injunction of the Michigan court was entitled to full
faith and credit, thus preventing Elwell from testifying in the federal pro-
ceedings.
Assuming, arguendo, that a public policy exception to the
full faith and credit command exists, we conclude that the dis-
trict court improperly relied on such an exception in this case
because of Missouri's equally strong public policy in favor of
full faith and credit .... Consequently, the district court incor-
rectly used Missouri's interest in full and fair discovery to over-
ride its interest in giving full faith and credit to a sister state's
judgment.59
Further, the Eighth Circuit rejected the district court's position that it
had the power to modify the injunction.60
The Bakers sought rehearing en banc on an issue not expressly reached
by the panel, arguing that Michigan case law does not give preclusive ef-
fect to consent judgments or to injunctions affecting nonparties, thereby
eliminating any full faith and credit issue.61 The Bakers' rehearing re-
quests were denied, and the case was remanded for reconsideration of
57. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 159 F.R.D. 519, 528 (W.D. Mo. 1994), rev'd, 86
F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 1996).
58. On the other issues raised by GM on appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the need
for discovery sanctions against GM for its willful violation of discovery orders, but held
that the heavy sanctions imposed at the outset of trial were an abuse of discretion, im-
properly depriving the manufacturer of its day in court. See Baker, 86 F.3d at 816-17. Fur-
ther, the award of $11.3 million in damages, unapportioned between compensatory and
punitive damages, occurred without jury instructions necessary to define and properly re-
strict the jury's discretion, thus violating due process. See id. at 817-18. These rulings were
not the subject of further appeals; therefore, on remand from the Supreme Court, deter-
mination of new, appropriate sanctions and a trial on all issues would be necessary. See
Baker v. General Motors Corp., 138 F.3d 1225, 1225-26 (8th Cir. 1998).
59. Baker, 86 F.3d at 819 (footnote omitted).
60. See id. (stating that "the mere fact that an injunction remains subject to modifica-
tion in one state does not render it unworthy of full faith and credit in another").
61. See Brief of Appellees, Petition for Rehearing En Banc at vi, Baker v. General
Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811 (8th Cir. 1996) (No. 95-1604).
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appropriate sanctions against GM and for a new trial, without Elwell's
testimony.62
C. The Parties' Contentions Before the Supreme Court
The Bakers' petition for a writ of certiorari focused on the need for
clarification about the reach of the full faith and credit principle as to
nonparties and for resolution of conflicting decisions of various courts
that had faced the question of enforcing the Michigan consent decree re-
garding Elwell's testimony in other product liability cases against GM.
Specifically, the Bakers initiated a two-pronged attack. Their primary
argument urged the Court to find the Full Faith and Credit Clause inap-
plicable because the Due Process Clause prevents a court from issuing an
order binding nonparties to its ruling. The Bakers' secondary argument
was a more generalized appeal to "institutional and systemic" integrity• 63
considerations.
In their primary position, the Bakers urged the Court to recognize the
implications of its previous decisions in Martin v. Wilks64 and Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein,6' and traced the history of due process,
as a guarantee of adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, back
66to the Court's rulings in personal jurisdiction cases. They contended
that enforcement of the Michigan injunction agreed to in the Elwell/GM
suit would "impair the right of petitioners and others similarly situated to
full acquisition of evidence necessary to prosecute their claims against
62. See Baker, 86 F.3d at 811 (denying rehearing en banc); see also Petitioner's Brief,
supra note 36, at 10.
63. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 18 (maintaining that "even if the Full
Faith and Credit obligation were somehow triggered here, it would have to yield to over-
riding principles of law: to institutional and systemic interests in the integrity of judicial
proceedings").
64. 490 U.S. 755, 761 (1989) (rejecting the "impermissible collateral attack" doctrine
asserted as bar to white firefighters seeking relief from effects of consent decree settling
black firefighters' civil rights suit).
65. 516 U.S. 367, 373-75 (1996) (holding that a federal court may not withhold full
faith and credit from a state court judgment approving a class action settlement simply be-
cause the settlement-released claims were within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal
courts).
66. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 13-14 (citing Phillips Petroleum Co. v.
Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 805 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
291 (1980); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958); Williams v. North Carolina, 325
U.S. 226, 230 (1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 727, 732 (1878); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, supra note 23, § 104 (referencing the principle that "'[a] judg-
ment rendered without judicial jurisdiction or without adequate notice or adequate oppor-
tunity to be heard will not be recognized or enforced in other states"').
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GM without any possible legal redress."'67
The Bakers' second argument identified scenarios in which it was ap-
propriate for the Supreme Court to decline to enforce a prior court's or-
der so as to preserve the public's "right to every man's evidence."
' 8
However, the Bakers specifically avoided characterizing this argument as
being based on public policy, 69 despite the ruling of the trial court and the
decisions of several other lower courts that declined to enforce the El-
well/GM judgment on the grounds of public policy.
70
In their brief-in-chief, the Bakers did not ask the Court to consider a
traditional approach to full faith and credit issues-one which begins
with a determination of the extent to which the law of the rendering
state, in this case, Michigan, would mandate enforcement of its own or-
der in these circumstances.7' In their reply brief, however, responding to
what they believed was GM's mischaracterization of Michigan law, the
Bakers argued that Michigan case law declined full preclusive effect in
two relevant areas: consent judgments73 and judgments, litigated or oth-
erwise, that attempt to bind nonparties.74 This last place positioning of
the state law argument was apparently the result of a tactical decision
when petitioning for certiorari; by limiting their petition, and therefore
their issues for initial briefing, to a clear constitutional argument that jux-
taposed full faith and credit with due process concerns, the Bakers'
strengthened their chances of obtaining Supreme Court review. Their
argument also was made more compelling by the existence of a conflict
among the states over interpretation of the Michigan state court order.75
67. Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 17.
68. See id. at 18-19.
69. See id. at 18 n.8, 24 n.16.
70. See supra note 10 (citing cases addressing the interpretation of the Elwell/GM
consent judgment in other product liability claims against GM).
71. See infra notes 133-38, 235-44 and accompanying text (analyzing the preclusive
effect of a consent judgment).
72. See Reply Brief for Petitioners at 19, Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct.
657 (1998) (No. 96-653) [hereinafter Petitioner's Reply Brief], available in 1997 WL
471824 ("Our argument in no way depends on the status of the injunction under Michigan
law. However, GM's position is untenable....").
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See generally Stephen M. Shapiro, Certiorari Practice: The Supreme Court's
Shrinking Docket, LITIG., Spring 1998, at 25.
[In recent Terms] the Court has tightened up its own centralized mechanism for
quickly disposing of almost seven thousand annual requests for review.... In this
period of contraction, even seasoned Court watchers hesitate to predict which
cases will make the cut. The problem is particularly acute for private litigants...
. [The Court] grants only 3 percent of private paid petitions."
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
The responsive arguments made by GM rested on traditional, if boldly
stated, principles of jurisprudence about full faith and credit. GM con-
tended that full faith and credit mandates respect for final orders, even
orders granting mandatory equitable relief: "[i]n light of the clear consti-
tutional text, this Court has never refused to apply the Clause in cases
that arise in equity. 76 The company warned that any attempt to avoid
enforcement of the Michigan state order would create a public policy ex-
ception that would undermine the essential character of the full faith and
credit principle.7 "It has long been settled that there is no 'public policy'
exception to the command of full faith and credit for judgments,"78 ar-
gued GM, citing cases79 and scholarship ° that characterize the Full Faith
and Credit Clause and its statutory extension as creating a virtual "iron
rule" of enforcement from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Furthermore, GM
argued that enforcement was not being sought against the Bakers, but
only against Elwell, and that the Bakers merely were affected in an inci-
dental manner that did not justify a due process analysis.8' Adopting a
due process inquiry "would expand Wilks beyond all recognizable
bounds and effectively abandon any limits on the type of interests af-
Id. An argument that the Eighth Circuit erred in failing to apply Michigan preclusion law,
while "certworthy," may have proven to be unattractive. See id. at 27 ("On very rare oc-
casions the Court grants certiorari to supervise a federal appellate court's application of
state law on the theory that the lower court has fundamentally misperceived the require-
ments of the Erie doctrine. But this happens only once or twice in a decade.").
76. Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 18. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS, supra note 23, § 102 ("A valid judgment that orders the doing of an act other
than the payment of money, or that enjoins the doing of an act, may be enforced ... in
other states." (emphasis added)).
77. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 23.
78. Id. at 12.
79. See, e.g., Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908), cited in Respondent's Brief,
supra note 46, at 12, 20 and 24 n.14 (finding that a judgment by a state court should have
the same effect in every other court in the United States).
80. See William L. Reynolds, The Iron Law of Full Faith and Credit, 53 MD. L. REV.
412, 412 (1994), cited in Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 25, n.15) (arguing that the
requirement to give full faith and credit to a sister state's final judgment "is so clear and
strong that it might be called the 'Iron Law' of Full Faith and Credit").
81. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 35. GM argued the due process claims
were flawed for the "simple reason that [the Bakers did] not have any sufficiently substan-
tial 'liberty' or. 'property' interest in obtaining the testimony of a single witness ... to trig-
ger formal due process protection even if affording the injunction full faith and credit
[meant] foreclosing their hope to have Elwell testify." Id. (citing the due process test of
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972) as support of this proposition). GM
argued that unlike the plaintiffs in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), the Bakers were
not being deprived of their cause of action, but only of the non-unique testimony of one
witness. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 35-36.
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forded due process protections." 2  In making these arguments, GM
downplayed the settlement that dictated the final order, implying the fi-
nal order was based on findings made when the court issued a prelimi-
nary injunction, following a "full[y] adversarial" hearing."3
General Motors opened the door to analysis of the underlying Michi-
gan law by arguing that Michigan law regarding collateral attacks on in-
junctive relief would require third parties to return to the issuing court to
seek modification or vacation of the injunction, a prerequisite the Bakers
had failed to satisfy. 4 GM contended that "[a]ffording the injunction the
same respect that it would receive in the courts of the rendering State
simply requires petitioners to raise their claims for access to Elwell's tes-
timony-which necessarily require altering the injunction-in the Michi-
gan court that issued the original decree. ''85 Finally, GM's brief asserted
that the Supreme Court has "squarely held that ... a consent decree is
entitled to full faith and credit." 6
III. THE BASICS: INTERJURISDICTIONAL PRECLUSION PRINCIPLES
The multiple theories urged during the course of Baker v. General
Motors Corp. demonstrate how complex the jurisprudence of full faith
and credit can become. For purposes of discussing the interjurisdictional
preclusion theories relied on by the parties or utilized by the courts, cer-
tain abbreviations and terms adopted by commentators on conflicts law"'
will be used here: "F-i" refers to the first court that "renders" the judg-
82. Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 39.
83. See id. at 4-5.
84. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 42-43. GM argued that under the appli-
cable rule, a "'judgment or order' may be set aside or vacated 'only by the judge who en-
tered the judgment or order, unless that judge is absent or unable to act."' Id. at 42
(quoting MICH. CT. R. 2.613(B); see Huber v. Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co., 408 N.W.2d
505, 508 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987) (applying the rule); Berar Enters., Inc. v. Harmon, 300
N.W.2d 519, 523-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (rejecting a collateral attack because it did not
comply with Rule 2.613(B)).
85. Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 13. GM's "return" argument was rejected
by the Supreme Court because the Full Faith and Credit Clause could not be used to re-
quire the Bakers to submit to Michigan's jurisdiction. See Baker v. General Motors, Corp.,
118 S. Ct. 657, 672 (1998).
86. Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 28 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Ep-
stein, 516 U.S. 367, 373 (1996)). For the proposition that a consent judgment is a "judicial
act and possesses the same force and character as a judgment rendered following a con-
tested trial or motion," see the Michigan case, Trendall v. Solomon, 443 N.W.2d 509, 511
(Mich. Ct. Ap. 1989).
87. See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, Interjurisdictional Preclusion, 96 MICH. L. REV.
945, 947-48 (1998) (incorporating the use of symbols in interjurisdictional preclusion
analysis).
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ment at issue while "F-2" will be used for any jurisdiction/court in which
"recognition" is sought. In addition, the Bakers and other plaintiffs in
product liability suits who were similarly affected by the Elwell/GM or-
der will be described as "nonparties" or "third parties," referring to their
status in F-1. To facilitate understanding of the Baker decision, it is help-
ful to organize the major theories into separate analytical approaches:
1. F-2's Public Policy Approach: Accepting the principle that full faith
and credit applies to the judgment in question, the F-2 court should ref-
use to enforce the F-1 judgment when there is a strong, overriding public
policy interest recognized by the F-2 jurisdiction. This approach was
adopted by the Missouri federal district court, and several other trial
courts, in responding to the perceived unfairness of being asked to en-
force the Michigan consent judgment in products liability suits asserted
against GM.88 This use of public policy to avoid full faith and credit was
89addressed specifically by Justice Ginsburg in the majority opinion.
2. Iron Rule Approach: Accepting the principle that full faith and
credit applies, the court should follow the "iron rule," rejecting the exis-
tence of public policy exceptions generally or, alternatively, rejecting as-
sertions of a weak F-2 public policy. Any effect on nonparties in this in-
stance is merely an incidental, although unfortunate, consequence of the
proper application of full faith and credit. This argument was made by
GM and, in large part, was accepted by the Eighth Circuit.90 Important
limitations on this approach are implied by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion. 9'
3. Due Process Analytical Approach: F-i's judgment, when applied to
nonparties, violates the due process rights of such persons to notice and
an opportunity to be heard on the issues, and therefore due process
should be recognized as a specific limitation on full faith and credit.
92
This argument was the central one made by the Bakers in their initial
briefs, but for reasons discussed herein at Part V.C, it was not addressed
by the Supreme Court in its decision.
4. Institutional/Systemic Integrity Approach: Despite the full faith and
credit command, the Supreme Court always has recognized instances
88. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 664; see also supra note 10 (discussing cases in which the
court refused to enforce a consent judgment on the basis of public policy).
89. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 664; see infra Part V.A (examining public policy excep-
tions to full faith and credit).
90. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 86 F.3d 811, 819-20 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 118
S. Ct. 657 (1998); see also Respondent's Brief, supra note 46, at 39.
91. See infra Parts IV, V (analyzing the Supreme Court's approach to the full faith
and credit requirements for third parties).
92. See Petitioner's Brief, supra note 36, at 12-18.
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where enforcement of F-l's order will not be required in F-2 courts; the
Supreme Court should recognize that an attempt by F-1 to determine the
admissibility of evidence in F-2 is another such instance. This approach,
argued by the Bakers as a secondary position in their brief,93 and despite
a certain vagueness in precedent, comes the closest to Justice Ginsburg's
eventual ruling.94
5. First Step Approach, Looking to F-i's Preclusion Law: The analysis
of a full faith and credit enforcement question should begin with the
"first step" of determining the effect that the judgment would have under
the F-1 court's preclusion law. If the F-1 jurisdiction would not enforce
the judgment under these circumstances, the full faith and credit com-
mand should have no application.95 This argument was an alternative
raised by the Bakers in briefing before the Eighth Circuit, and in respon-
sive briefing before the Supreme Court. As will be discussed in greater
detail below at Part V.B, this argument became the major focus of Jus-
tice Kennedy in his concurring opinion.
6. Waiver Approach, Holding that Only F-i Has Authority to Modify
Injunction: GM took the position that any relief from an F-1 injunction
must be obtained from the F-1 court that issued the order. In essence,
GM argued that the Bakers were bound by the Michigan judgment be-
cause of their failure to attempt to seek any appropriate relief from the
rendering court. This argument seems disingenuous at best and, at worst,
actually heightens the jurisdictional or due process concerns about GM's
attempt to affect the claims of persons who were never present in Michi-
gan.9% Although the law generally recognizes that the issuing court has
authority to enforce or modify injunctive relief, it seems likely that any
attempt by the Bakers or similar claimants to seek relief in Michigan
would have been met by the traditional consent judgment argument that
the F-1 court does not have the power to modify a consent judgment in
93. See id. at 18-29.
94. See infra Part IV (analyzing Justice Ginsburg's Majority Opinion in Baker v.
General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657 (1998)).
95. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 671 (1998) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring).
96. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d) ("Every order granting an injunction and every
restraining order ... is binding only upon the parties to the action, their officers, agents,
servants, employees, and attorneys, and upon those persons in active concert or participa-
tion with them who receive actual notice of the order by personal service or otherwise.").
97. See Opal Lake Ass'n. v. Michaywe' Ltd. Partnership, 209 N.W.2d 478, 485 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1973) ("[An injunction is always subject to modification or dissolution if the
facts merit it."); accord Misch v. Lehman, 144 N.W. 556, 557 (Mich. 1913) (permitting
modification of injunction if future circumstances made the injunction inequitable).
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the'absence of the consent of the original parties,98 which GM certainly
was unlikely to grant. The Supreme Court did not directly address this
argument,99 and it will not be a major focus of this Article.
None of the approaches summarized above is limited in application to
consent judgments. Even without consideration of the proper applica-
tion of preclusion principles to consent judgments, the language used to
describe the preclusive effects given to judgments generally can prove
difficult,'00 involving subtle, overlapping concepts.1 1 To facilitate under-
standing of the parties' positions, and the ruling announced by Justice
Ginsburg, certain traditional terms and definitions must be examined.""
A. The Common Law of Preclusion by (Mostly Litigated) Judgment
A central goal of litigation is dispute resolution 03 and, relative to this
overarching goal, common law preclusion principles serve two important
aims: "the avoidance of repetitive litigation and the promotion of finality
98. See, e.g.; Draughn v. Hill, 186 N.W.2d 855, 857-58 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (dis-
cussing the general rule that consent judgments are unassailable by third persons). But see
Township of Shelby v. Liquid Disposal, Inc., 246 N.W.2d 384, 386 (Mich. Ct. App. 1976)
(recognizing an exception to the general rule that permits a court, when ruling on a motion
for contempt, to modify a consent judgment that has an adverse impact on third persons);
cf Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 378 (1992) (permitting court to
modify consent decree despite objections of original party). The Court noted that
[a] consent decree no doubt embodies an agreement of the parties and thus in
some respects is contractual in nature. But it is an agreement that the parties de-
sire and expect will be reflected in, and be enforceable as, a judicial decree that is
subject to the rules generally applicable to other judgments and decrees.
Id.; System Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 647 (1961) (noting that a court errs when
it refuses to modify an injunction or consent decree in light of changed factual or legal
conditions).
99. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 665 n.9 (discussing antisuit injunctions).
100. See Erichson, supra note 87, at 945 ("Res judicata is hard enough already. Con-
sider it at the interjurisdictional level, and we are asking for headaches. But consider it at
that level we must, because litigation trends make interjurisdictional preclusion more im-
portant than ever." (footnote ommitted)).
101. See generally FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL.; CIVIL PROCEDURE §§ 11.7- 11.24 (4th
ed. 1992) [hereinafter JAMES JR. ET AL] (discussing preclusion between same parties and
against nonparties); Erichson, supra note 87, at 945 (providing a more complete examina-
tion of preclusion principles).
102. One treatise has noted that unnecessary confusion may be caused by attempting
to use traditional preclusion terms in discussing consent judgments: "It might ... be better
to disregard the res judicata vocabulary of preclusion by judgment, for fear that incom-
plete analogies may lead to inadequate results." WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 7, § 4443, at
381 (advocating the use of contractual enforcement terms to analyze most preclusive ef-
fects given to consent judgments). The need for caution in analyzing preclusive effects of
consent judgments is discussed in greater depth at Part III.C.
103. See JAMES, JR. ET AL., supra note 101, § 11.2, at 581 ("[T]he purpose of a lawsuit
is not only to do substantial justice but to bring an end to controversy.").
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of judgments."' ' 4 Thus,
[f]or the litigant, finality is an important goal; the purpose of
litigation is dispute resolution, and the parties want a resolution
that they can rely on. A certain and final resolution permits the
parties to order their affairs and plan in a sensible way; other-
wise, they cannot. Society is no less interested in finality than
are the litigants. Resolving a single dispute more than once
wastes limited societal resources.105
The central policy behind the common law can be summarized as "one
trial of an issue is enough." 1°6 Caution must be exercised, however, in
applying this shorthand definition, for it competes with another maxim:
"'everyone should have his own day in court."' 1 7 As Justice White noted
on behalf of a unanimous Supreme Court in 1971, a court being asked to
apply preclusion principles must determine "'whether the party against
whom an estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate'
the issue because due process prohibits estoppel when a party never had
an opportunity to present evidence."'18
An analysis of preclusion by judgment begins with the common law
definitions for key terms. Used generically, res judicata refers both to res
judicata and collateral estoppel. In their more narrow sense, these indi-
vidual terms often have been replaced by claim preclusion and issue pre-
clusion respectively. Justice Ginsburg provided a useful summary of
these definitions:
"Res judicata" is the term traditionally used to describe two
discrete effects: (1) what we now call claim preclusion (a valid
final adjudication of a claim precludes a second action on that
claim or any part of it) and (2) issue preclusion, long called
"collateral estoppel" (an issue of fact or law, actually litigated
and resolved by a valid final judgment, binds the parties in a
104. Id. § 11.26, at 625; see also Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980) ("As this
Court and other courts have often recognized, res judicata and collateral estoppel relieve
parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, conserve judicial resources, and, by
preventing inconsistent decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.").
105. WILLIAM M. RICHMAN & WILLIAM L. REYNOLDS, UNDERSTANDING
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 106[a], at 311 (2d'ed. 1993).
106. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 4, § 24.1 at 950; see also Baldwin v. Iowa State
Traveling Men's Ass'n., 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931) (finality of judgments comports with
public policy goals).
107. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 762 (1989) (quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT
ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4449, at 417 (1981)).
108. See SCOLES & HAY, supra note 4, § 24.1.A, at 952 (quoting Blonder-Tongue
Labs., Inc., v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)).
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
subsequent action, whether on the same or a different claim).1°9
Proper application of these terms depends on the relationship between
the court that issued the judgment and the parties who are bound-and
with other persons or entities who may be affected."t
Underlying the rules of res judicata is the notion that persons
who have had an opportunity to litigate a matter may justly be
denied an opportunity to litigate it on another occasion. Such
persons include those who are the named parties to an action
and who appear or are validly served with process in the action.
The rules of res judicata are applied most frequently to parties
in this strict sense."
As seen in Baker, problems arise when there is an attempt by the par-
ties or the court to extend the reach of the judgment to persons not
strictly "parties" to the original judicial proceedings.
Preclusion principles sometimes work a hardship on one or more par-
ties and may be perceived to be "unfair." If a party believes that a trial
decision is wrong or that it occurred, for example, because of physical
problems that prevented her from obtaining necessary evidence to pres-
ent her case completely, rules of procedure function together with pre-
clusion principles to limit the unhappy party's remedies. She may seek
reversal or modification through direct appeal or, subject to time limita-
tions, by asking the rendering court to reopen or set aside the judgment
through rules such as Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60."2 Collateral
attack by a separate suit generally is barred,"3 except to the extent that
109. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 664 n.5 (1998) (citations omitted);
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980) (defining issue preclusion). An
earlier summary than Baker emphasizes the role of parties in these definitions: "Under res
judicata, a final judgment on the merits of an action precludes the parties or their privies
from relitigating issues that were or could have been raised in that action"; whereas,
"[u]nder collateral estoppel, once a court decides an issue of fact or law necessary to its
judgment, that decision precludes relitigation of the same issue on a different cause of ac-
tion between the same parties." Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 467 n.6
(1982).
110. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, supra note 109, § 34(2) ("A
party is bound by and entitled to the benefits of the rules of res judicata with respect to
determinations made while he was a party."), with id. §§ 43-63 (describing substantive le-
gal relationships which may result in preclusion applying to persons who are not, strictly
speaking, parties).
111. JAMES JR. ET AL., supra note 101, § 11.7, at 586 (emphasis added) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34 (1980)).
112. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60 (providing a means for seeking relief from judgments or
orders based on clerical mistakes, mistakes of the parties, newly discovered evidence,
fraud, etc.).
113. See Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 398 (1981) (noting that
"[a] judgment merely voidable because based upon an erroneous view of the law is not
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jurisdiction issues may survive the original judgment when enforcement
is sought in a separate suit.
114
A modern trend in preclusion law has been to stress the need for judi-
cial finality, which is in large part the consequence of pressures imposed
by increasingly crowded court dockets."5 This trend is manifested in the
willingness of courts to expand recognition of preclusive effects created
by a judgment."' For example, modern pleading rules permit parties to
join multiple claims and to amend claims in response to challenges about
the legal sufficiency of pleadings, thus expanding the scope of what might
be resolved in any first suit. 7 The corresponding trend in the common
law of claim preclusion is to recognize "that a judgment against plaintiff
is preclusive not simply when it is on the merits but when the procedure
in the first action afforded plaintiff a fair opportunity to get to the mer-
its. '' 1 8 Similarly, though traditional principles of issue preclusion limit
the preclusive effect to issues actually litigated by the exact same par-
ties, 9 in recent years many courts have expanded the opportunities for
issue preclusion; for example, some courts have dropped the requirement
120
of "mutuality" of parties for offensive collateral estoppel purposes.
open to collateral attack, but can be corrected only by a direct review").
114. See Molen v. Friedman, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 651, 655 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ("A collat-
eral attack will lie only for a claim that the judgment is void on its face for lack of personal
or subject matter jurisdiction or for the granting of relief which the court has no power to
grant.") (citations omitted); Davis v. Haas & Haas Inc., 694 N.E.2d 588, 590 (Ill. App. Ct.
1998) (stating that lack of subject matter jurisdiction by the rendering court leaves the
judgment vulnerable to collateral attack); State v. Belmarez, 577 N.W.2d 264, 271 (Neb.
1998) (limiting collateral attack to lack of personal and subject matter jurisdiction); Hix-
son v. Plump, 704 A.2d 1159, 1161 (Vt. 1997) (stating that collateral attack is available
where a court lacks subject matter or personal jurisdiction, or acts ultra vires); Slaughter v.
Virginia, 284 S.E.2d 824, 826 (Va. 1981) (lack of personal jurisdiction voids a judgment);
Osborn v. Painter, 909 P.2d 960, 964 (Wyo. 1996) (stating that a judgment void for lack of
jurisdiction may be attacked collaterally "only where the invalidity appears on the face of
the record" but must be attacked directly "[w]here the invalidity does not appear on the
face of the record").
115. But see Jack L. Johnson, Comment, Due or Voodoo Process: Virtual Representa-
tion as a Justification for the Preclusion of A Nonparty's Claim, 68 TUL. L. REV. 1303,
1307, 1309, 1316-18 (1994) (disputing justification for extension of preclusion by loosening
the privity requirement).
116. See JAMES JR. ET AL., supra note 101, § 11.2, at 580-81.
117. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) ("Relief in the alternative or of several different
types may be demanded."); FED. R. CIV. P. 13 (compulsory and permissive counter-
claims); FED. R. Civ. P. 15 (allowing amended and supplemental pleadings).
118. JAMES JR. ET AL., supra note 101, § 11.16, at 607.
119. "Mutuality" is a doctrine, also seen in contract law, by which neither party is
deemed bound unless both parties are bound. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1021 (6th
ed. 1990).
120. See Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 329, 331-33 (1979) (permitting
offensive collateral estoppel, thereby allowing plaintiff to foreclose defendant from "reliti-
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Courts following this trend have emphasized that as long as issue preclu-
sion is applied against persons who were "parties or their privies" in the
first suit, due process is not offended because such persons are deemed
to have had a day in court on the issue. 2'
Of course, another aspect of the modern trend has been expansion of
the definition of "parties or their privies" who will be subject to preclu-
sion by judgment. Despite this movement, the courts generally have
acted with restraint when there is an attempt to apply preclusion to a
person who was not a formal party to the judgment in the first action:
[T]he bases on which a judgment can be given a preclusive
effect against a nonparty can be grouped into two categories:
preclusion by representation, and preclusion by reason of sub-
stantive legal relationships. These two categories are in many
respects related because, as we shall see, the substantive legal
relationships that result in preclusion have an element of repre-
sentation. Broadly speaking, the question posed in applying
preclusion on either of these bases is whether the relationship
gating" an issue defendant previously litigated unsuccessfully in suit involving a different
party); Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350
(1971) (eliminating the requirement of mutuality of parties in applying collateral estoppel
to bar relitigation of issues decided earlier in federal suits); see also Howard M. Erichson,
Use It or Lose It, Dealing with Issue Preclusion in Complex Cases, 148 N.J. L.J. 204 (1997).
Offensive nonmutual issue preclusion refers to a new claimant's assertion of issue
preclusion to inflict liability against a defendant who previously lost on that issue,
in contrast to defensive issue preclusion, where a party asserts issue preclusion to
shield itself from liability to a claimant who previously lost on that issue.
Id.
121. See generally Tyus v. Schoemehl, 93 F.3d 449, 454, 458 (8th Cir. 1996) (dismissing
claim of African American plaintiffs in voting rights action on ground of "virtual represen-
tation" by interests of another group of minority members, emphasizing that preclusion
based on "privity" is a recognized exception to the tradition that everyone should have his
own day in court); Major v. Frontenac Indus., Inc., 968 S.W.2d 758, 762 (Mo. Ct. App.
1998) (requiring garnishee to pay damages that had been awarded to garnishor in prior
suit against garnishee's insured because the interests of the nonparty in the prior suit, the
garnishee, were "so closely related to the interests of the... [garnishee's insured that] the
nonparty can be fairly considered to have had his day in court").
122. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 798 (1996). In Richards, the
United States Supreme Court stated:
of course, [preclusion] principles do not always require one to have been a party
to a judgment in order to be bound by it. Most notably, there is an exception
when it can be said that there is "privity" between a party to the second case and
a party who is bound by an earlier judgment. For example, a judgment that is
binding on a guardian or trustee may also bind the ward or the beneficiaries of a
trust. Moreover, although there are clearly constitutional limits on the "privity"
exception, the term "privity" is now used to describe various relationships be-
tween litigants that would not have come within the traditional definition of that
term.
Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 4 (1980)).
[48:419
Common Law Preclusion
between the person who was a party and the person whom the
party is treated as representing is such that the absentee's interests
can be regarded as having been fairly represented by the party.12 3
Frequently, the constitutional basis for this restraint has been de-
scribed as sounding in due process.'24 The accuracy and scope of this
statement, however, are called into question, as will be seen by the
Court's decision in Baker.
B. The Relationship between Common Law Preclusion and Full Faith
and Credit
The relationship of claim and issue preclusion to full faith and credit'25
123. JAMES JR. ET AL., supra note 101, § 11.27, at 626 (emphasis added). See generally
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2252 (1997) (rejecting a class action set-
tlement plan because the plan did not satisfy the requirements of common issue predomi-
nance and adequacy of representation); Richards, 517 U.S. at 797 (condemning "extreme"
applications of nonparty preclusion). But see Robert G. Bone, Rethinking the "Day in
Court" Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 196, 198, 289 (1992) (urging
expansion of nonparty preclusion).
124. The importance of due process as a restraint on common law preclusion was iden-
tified quite early by the Supreme Court:
The doctrine of res judicata rests at bottom upon the ground that the party to be
affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated or had an oppor-
tunity to litigate the same matter in a former action in a court of competent juris-
diction. The opportunity to be heard is an essential requisite of due process of
law in judicial proceedings. And as a State may not, consistently with the Four-
teenth Amendment, enforce a judgment against a party named in the proceed-
ings without a hearing or an opportunity to be heard, so it cannot, without disre-
garding the requirement of due process, give a conclusive effect to a prior
judgment against one who is neither a party nor in privity with a party therein.
Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Newport, 247 U.S. 464, 476 (1918) (citations omitted), quoted with
approval in Richards, 517 U.S. at 797 n.4 (holding that a state's right to apply preclusion
principles is limited by due process); see also JAMES JR. ET AL., supra note 101, § 11.27, at
627 ("The scope of preclusion applied to nonparties is constrained by due process consid-
erations, as seen in Martin v. Wilks.").
125. The requirement of "full faith and credit" derives from Article IV, Section 1 of
the Constitution. See supra note 3 and accompanying text. By its own terms, the constitu-
tional provision applies only to the states. The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738
(1994), provides that federal courts are obligated to give the same recognition to state
court judgments as would other courts of that state. While no statutory or constitutional
provision specifically states an obligation of the states to give full faith and credit to the
judgments of federal courts, this principle has been recognized and applied uniformly. See
Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act ("UEFJA"), 13 U.L.A. 149 (1964)
(adopted in 48 states and the Virgin Islands); see also, e.g., Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S. 165,
170 (1938). There is no substantive difference in the effect of the "full faith and credit
command," as Justice Ginsburg refers to it in Baker, in its constitutional form as opposed
to its statutory source. See, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 483-84
n.24 (1982) (explaining that § 1738 was enacted to "implement" the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and to ensure that federal courts were bound by state judgments); Bigelow v. Old
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is fairly easy to describe, but, as the history of Baker v. General Motors
demonstrates, it is more difficult to understand in practice.1 16 Full faith
and credit has been interpreted as federalizing the application of claim
and issue preclusion.2  Under full faith and credit, the F-2 court must
give the same credit as the F-1 court would give its own judgment, but no
128more.
Because of the relationship between preclusion principles and full faith
and credit, the Supreme Court often has emphasized that the "first step"
in analyzing an enforcement question involving full faith and credit is to
determine the rendering state's law on claim and issue preclusion.29 "If
Dominion Copper Mining and Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111, 129 (1912) (stating that a fed-
eral judgment is entitled to the same sanction that would attach to the like judgment of a
court of that state). For purposes of discussing Baker, it is unnecessary to distinguish the
source of the full faith and credit command, since arguably both the constitutional provi-
sion and the statute apply. Although the Baker case tested the effect of the Michigan
judgment in federal court in Missouri, it did so on the basis of diversity. Thus, both state-
to-state (Article IV) and state-to-federal (§ 1738) patterns exist. But see Hannah v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 969 F. Supp. 554, 559 (D. Ariz. 1996) ("[A]s a court sitting in diversity,
it is the full faith and credit clause that would require it to enforce the Michigan injunc-
tion, not § 1738. As a result the court must look to the policies of the forum state, in this
case the state of Arizona.").
126. See Erichson, supra note 87, at 997.
127. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 105, § 107, at 316 ("[T]he governing law
of full faith and credit might be described as the interstate application of the doctrines of
claim preclusion and issue preclusion."); see also Degnan, supra note 1, at 773 (advocating
a broad statement of res judicata: "A valid judgment rendered in any judicial system
within the United States must be recognized by all other judicial systems within the United
States, and the claims and issues precluded by that judgment, and the parties bound
thereby, are determined by the law of the system which rendered the judgment.") (empha-
sis removed).
128. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 384
(1985). Some commentators consider the possibility of "more" effect for judgments to be
an open question under full faith and credit, while other commentators treat the question
as having been answered in the negative by the Supreme Court's decision in Marrese.
Compare SCOLES & HAY, supra note 4, § 24.1.B, at 954 (arguing that granting "additional
preclusive effect" is an open question), with RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 105, §
107, at 318-22 (arguing that F-2 courts do not have the latitude to expand the preclusive
effect of an F-1 judgment).
129. See, e.g., Parsons Steel, Inc. v. First Alabama Bank, 474 U.S. 518, 522 (1986)
(holding the court of appeals erred by failing to consider the preclusive effect the state
court would give to its own judgment); Marresse, 470 U.S. at 384 (remanding for federal
court to consider state law on preclusive effect of state court judgment); Migra v. Warren
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 87 (1984) (remanding to permit federal district
court in § 1983 claim to interpret Ohio preclusion law regarding effect of its prior judg-
ment); Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 323 (1983) (recognizing that under rules of collat-
eral estoppel adopted by Virginia courts, no preclusive effect is given to guilty pleas; there-
fore, judgment of conviction did not preclude § 1983 claim challenging propriety of police
search); Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 81, 86 (1944) (looking to North Carolina law to de-
termine effect of North Carolina judgment awarding alimony).
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the state courts would not give preclusive effect to the prior judgment,
'the courts of the United States can accord it no greater efficacy' under
1738. " 3° This step is important because the common law of preclusion by
judgment is not uniform among the states, with some states following
modern trends and other states adhering to mutuality and similarly strict• •• 131
prerequisites. Futhermore, as suggested at Part II.C, some states spe-
cifically restrict the preclusive effect of consent judgments available un-
der the common law.
32
In Baker v. General Motors, Justice Kennedy's separate opinion, 33
concurring in the judgment, emphasized this traditional approach. Ac-
cording to Kennedy, the threshold step should have been to determine
the effect the Michigan judgment would have had in Michigan:
The beginning point of full faith and credit analysis requires
a determination of the effect the judgment has in the courts of
the issuing State. In our most recent full faith and credit cases,
we have said that determining the force and effect of a judg-
ment should be the first step in our analysis .... A conclusion
that the issuing State would not give the prior judgment preclu-
sive effect ends the inquiry, making it unnecessary to determine
the existence of any exceptions to full faith and credit. We can-
not decline to inquire into these state-law questions when the
inquiry will obviate new extensions or exceptions to full faith
and credit. 34
Justice Kennedy concluded, based on his review of state law, that
Michigan law does not give preclusive effect to judgments as against
nonparties, regardless of whether the judgment sounds in law or equity."'
130. Prosise, 462 U.S. at 313 n.6 (quoting Union & Planters' Bank v. Memphis, 189
U.S. 71, 75 (1903)).
131. See RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 105, § 107[c] at 318 ("The states differ
on several questions: the dimensions of a cause of action .... the kinds of dismissals which
are 'on the merits,' the persons who are considered to be parties and privies, and the rules
of mutuality.").
132. See James, supra note 7, at 180; Sheldon R. Shapiro, Annotation, Modern Views
of State Courts as to Whether Consent Judgment Is Entitled to Res Judicata or Collateral
Estoppel Effect, 91 A.L.R.3D 1170,1173-74 (1979 & Supp. 1997).
133. Justice Scalia also wrote a short, separate opinion concurring in the judgment,
which provides little in the way of analysis. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct.
657, 668 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring).
134. Id. at 671 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
135. See id. at 671 (citing Nummer v. Treasury Dep't, 533 N.W.2d 250, 253 (Mich.
1995) (requiring mutuality of parties for estoppel to apply)). Justice Kennedy reasoned,
"[s]ince the Bakers were not parties to the Michigan proceedings and had no opportunity
to litigate any of the issues presented, it appears that Michigan law would not treat them
as bound by the judgment." Id.; Lichon v. American Universal Ins. Co., 459 N.W.2d 288,
298 (Mich. 1990) (requiring mutuality of parties and actual litigation of issue, elements
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Thus, GM had failed to satisfy its burden of persuasion to show that
Michigan courts would have bound the Bakers to the terms of the earlier
injunction prohibiting Elwell from testifying.'36
In all events, determining as a threshold matter the extent to
which Michigan law gives preclusive effect to the injunction
eliminates the need to decide whether full faith and credit ap-
plies to equitable decrees as a general matter or the extent to
which the general rules of full faith and credit are subject to ex-
ceptions. Michigan law would not seek to bind the Bakers to
the injunction and that suffices to resolve the case."'
Thus, if F-l's precedent establishes that F-1 would give the judgment
neither claim nor preclusive effect if requested in F-i, there exists no
constitutional or statutory full faith and credit obligation to enforce the
judgment in F-2. As will be shown below, however, Justice Ginsburg re-
jected this formula as providing the answer to the Baker case.138
The law on full faith and credit also has developed a body of principles
that help to define the preclusive effect of judgments in the interjurisdic-
tional context. Recently, the central principle has been characterized by
commentators as the "Iron Law," or iron rule, of full faith and credit,
which can be traced to the seminal Supreme Court ruling in Fauntleroy v.
Lum.
139
If the F-1 court has jurisdiction over both the person and the
subject matter, its judgment is entitled to full faith and credit in
F-2, even though that judgment is based upon a mistake of fact
or law. If the losing litigant wishes to correct such an error, she
must do so in F-i's courts-either on appeal or through some
other type of direct attack (such as a motion to vacate or a mo-
tion for relief from judgment). Once the F-1 judgment is final
according to the law of F-i, however, the Full Faith and Credit
Clause prohibits collateral attack in F-2. This might be called
the "Iron Law" of Full Faith and Credit.140
which were not satisfied by defendant's plea of nolo contendere); Bacon v. Walden, 152
N.W. 1061, 1063 (Mich. 1915) (holding prior suit's adjudication of level of lake was not
binding on subsequent owner of dam where law did not consider him privy and he was not
a party to original suit; prior suit's effect was limited to value as precedent); Detroit v. De-
troit Ry., 95 N.W. 992, 993 (Mich. 1903) (no binding effect to prior suit on nonparty).
136. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 672 (citing Detroit v. Quails, 454 N.W.2d 374, 383 (Mich.
1990); E & G Finance Co., v. Simms, 107 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Mich. 1961)).
137. Id. at 673 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
138. See infra Part V.B (analyzing Justice Kennedy's concurrence, which noted Justice
Ginsburg's concern for the affects of full faith).
139. 210 U.S. 230 (1908); see RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 105, § 111, at 339;
Reynolds, supra note 80, at 412-13.
140. RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 105, § 111, at 339 (footnotes omitted); see
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As with common law preclusion terms, the application of the iron rule
of full faith and credit can be perceived as creating an excessively harsh
or even unfair result. As described above, the primary remedy for par-
ties and their privies is direct attack by post-judgment motion or ap-
peal.141 In response to these unfairness concerns, however, courts have
recognized additional exceptions or defenses to full faith and credit. For
purposes of discussion, and at the risk of oversimplification, 42 these ex-
ceptions can be placed into three categories: (1) an essential defect in the
rendering court's judgment, usually a lack of personal or subject matter
jurisdiction;143 (2) a strong public policy asserted by the recognizing state,
which is raised as a bar to sister-state enforcement;'" and (3) "other" ex-
ceptions, derived from a narrow set of facts or dependent upon the
unique subject matter of the judgment in question and its relationship to
Fauntleroy, 210 U.S. at 237 ("[A]s the jurisdiction of the Missouri court is not open to dis-
pute the judgment cannot be impeached in Mississippi even if it went upon a misappre-
hension of the Mississippi law.").
141. See J.I.C. Elec., Inc. v. Murphy, 344 S.E.2d 835, 837-38 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)
(finding that injunction issued by Michigan court pursuant to consent judgment was enti-
tled to full faith and credit in North Carolina courts, and that party must appeal to Michi-
gan courts, not North Carolina courts, to seek a ruling that the injunction was void due to
lack of consent).
142. Compare, e.g., RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 105, §§ 112-13 (describing
exceptions based on problems with the F-1 decree and exceptions arising out of F-2's abil-
ity to ignore a valid F-1 judgment, and the dilemma of the public policy exception embod-
ied in section 103 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS); and SCOLES & HAY, su-
pra note 4, § 24.2.C, at 972-996 (discussing at length "defenses" to sister state judgments,
including procedural defects in judgment and public policy considerations), with Allan D.
Vestal, The Constitution and Preclusion/Res Judicata, 62 MICH. L. REV. 33, 43 (1963)
(listing three general categories of "exceptions or limitations," including "(1) a jurisdic-
tional limitation, (2) a limitation based upon the policy of the forum state, and (3) the limi-
tations inhering in the first judgment").
143. It has been noted by commentators that
[t]he older case law held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause ... [does] not pre-
clude on [sic] inquiry into the jurisdiction of the first court to render the judg-
ment sought to be enforced .... It must-be noted ... that this rule ... has been
limited severely by the application of [modern] principles of res judicata. The
rule therefore remains categorically true only when the judgment debtor did not
litigate the jurisdictional issue in the first forum or had no opportunity to do so
and the first forum, on the facts of the case, lacked jurisdiction.
SCOLES & HAY, supra note 4, § 24.2.C.1, at 972-73 (footnote omitted).
144. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, supra note 23, § 117, at 339
("A valid judgment rendered in one State of the United States will be recognized and en-
forced in a sister State even though the strong public policy of the latter State would have
precluded recovery in its courts on the original claim."), with id. § 103, at 312 ("A judg-
ment rendered in one State ... need not be recognized or enforced in a sister State if such
recognition or enforcement is not required by the national policy of full faith and credit
because it would involve an improper interference with important interests of the sister
State.").
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the recognizing state . Of these categories , only the lack of personal
jurisdiction over the purportedly "bound" party in the state that ren-
dered the judgment is accepted uniformly and defined clearly as a valid
interjurisdictional exception or defense to the full faith and credit com-
mand. In particular, the "public policy exception" has generated strong
criticism by scholars and, in recent years, has generated expressions ofS141
distaste from the Supreme Court.
Finally, distinctions between preclusion by judgment and the use of
145. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 7, 11 (1909) (holding that because the Washington
court that granted the divorce decree and ordered husband to convey Nebraska property
to wife did not have jurisdiction to affect title to land in Nebraska, full faith and credit did
not require Nebraska courts to enforce the Washington court order). "The majority
opinion in Fall stands for the principle that one state cannot directly affect title to land lo-
cated in another state." RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 105, § 112, at 348 (footnote
omitted); see Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 283-84, 285-86 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (permitting successive workers' compensation awards and noting the
first award of the Virginia Industrial Commission did not adjudicate the full measure of
workers' rights under the law of the District of Columbia). "[Ijt is tempting (and easy) to
dismiss the workers' compensation cases . . . as result-oriented decisions born of the
Court's desire to protect the injured worker at all costs." RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra
note 105, § 114, at 360.
146. A fourth category may exist, consisting of legislatively prescribed approaches to
what would otherwise be full faith and credit issues; such as interstate child support and
custody suits. See UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (amended
1958) §§ 1, 35-37, 39-40, 9B U.L.A. 394, 540-41, 543-44, 546 (1987) (1968 Revised Act);
UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (amended 1958) §§ 34-38, 9B
U.L.A. 603-06 (1987) (1950 Act); UNIFORM CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION ACT
(amended 1958) §§ 1, 3, 15, 9 U.L.A. 123-24, 143-44, 311 (1988 & Supp. 1991); UNIFORM
CHILD CUSTODY JURISDICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACT, (WESTLAW, 1998 Elec-
tronic Pocket Part, approved through July 1997); see also Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994) (requiring, by statute, full faith and credit in child custody
determinations).
147. One commentator has noted the following:
Section 103 [of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts] takes the quite contro-
versial position that there are some F-1 judgments that are perfectly valid under
the Due Process Clause, yet not entitled to full faith and credit in F-2.... Despite
Justice Stone's eloquence [in his dissent in Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S.
202, 213-23 (1933) (Stone, J., dissenting)] and the prestige of the American Law
Institute, it is quite doubtful that Section 103 provides an accurate statement of
the law.
Reynolds, supra, note 80, at 436, 438; see ALBERT A. EHRENZWEIG & DAVID W.
LOUISELL, JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL § 36-1, at 138 (3d ed. 1973) (describing section
103 as unsupported by "authority, policy, or reason"); Ronald A. Hecker, Comment, Full
Faith and Credit to Judgments: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement Second, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 282 (1966); accord, Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 664 n.6 (1998)
(citing scholarship that criticizes the use of the term "public policy" to rationalize a result
on choice of law perogatives); Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 382 n.26 (1990) (citing cases




judgments, or more accurately, decisions, as precedent should be noted.
The common law doctrine of stare decisis is a mandate that courts should
apply precedent by giving appropriate weight to the prior determinations
of courts on issues of law.' 48 Preclusion is not a concept associated with
this doctrine, and full faith and credit has only minimal impact on its ap-
plication. 149 "A state court's freedom to rely on prior precedent in re-
jecting a litigant's claims does not afford it similar freedom to bind a liti-
gant to a prior judgment to which he was not a party."15 Care should be
taken not to blur the line between the doctrines of preclusion and stare
decisis, so as to avoid improper interpretations of the full faith and credit
command."'
C. A Cautionary Note: Interjurisdictional Preclusion Principles Applied
to Consent Judgments May Give Rise to Specific Fairness Concerns
Early Supreme Court consideration of full faith and credit enforce-
ment questions did not distinguish between litigated and consent judg-
ments. For example, in 1933, in Yarborough v. Yarborough,' the Su-
preme Court ruled that under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, a
Georgia consent judgment setting forth the father's obligation to pay
support to his daughter was a bar to the daughter's subsequent suit in
South Carolina.' 3 The majority found it irrelevant to the full faith and
credit concerns that the consent judgment, which represented a settle-
148. See JAMES JR. ET AL., supra note 101, § 11.6, at 585.
149. The Supreme Court's decisions in Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident
Commission of California, 294 U.S. 532 (1935), and Pacific Employers Insurance Co. v.
Industrial Accident Commission of California, 306 U.S. 493 (1939), served to minimize the
constitutional restrictions on state choice-of-law decisions. See Thomas v. Washington
Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261, 272-78 (1980) (plurality opinion) (discussing the important
role of stare decisis within the judicial system generally and within the Supreme Court, but
noting this doctrine does not prohibit new analysis of the law); see also 18 JAMES WM.
MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.02[4][a], at 134-22 (3d ed. 1998) ("The
courts of one state do not owe obedience to the courts of another state, except when fol-
lowing the law of another state under its choice-of-law rules." (footnote omitted)).
150. Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 805 (1996) (holding that because a
group of citizens challenging the application of a local occupational tax had neither notice
nor sufficient representation during prior litigation regarding the constitutionality of that
tax, the prior adjudication "as a matter of federal due process, may not bind them and thus
cannot bar them from challenging" the tax).
151. See infra Part V.B and notes 248-49 (discussing the consequences of ignoring dis-
tinctions between preclusion and stare decisis, specifically in the context of nonparties).
152. 290 U.S. 202 (1993).
153. See id. at 204, 212-13 (applying the Full Faith and Credit Clause, refusing to con-
sider the interests of South Carolina in the litigation); see also Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 7,
13-14 (1909) (declining to require transfer of title to real property under full faith and
credit without considering equities of divorce settlement decree).
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ment of all divorce issues between the mother and father, may not have
been a fair resolution of the daughter's future support needs. 54 Over the
years, the Supreme Court frequently has resolved issues of preclusion by
judgment, but has not resolved the question of whether special fairness
concerns exist in the context of consent judgments.'
In 1959, however, an influential article by Professor Fleming James Jr.,
described an important distinction between the appropriate scope of
common law preclusion for litigated versus consensual judgments.16 Pro-
fessor James noted that although courts generally give claim preclusive
effect to consent judgments, the courts are, and in his belief should be,
reluctant to find issue preclusive effect arising from such an order. Pro-
fessor James therefore concluded that a "consent judgment should not be
given any effect as collateral estoppel except in the rare case where it
may fairly be said that the parties intended this effect."'57 Even where
the parties stipulated factual and legal conclusions, he emphasized that
the common law does not require that recitals be accorded binding effect
in subsequent actions, because the "rules pertaining to judgments do not
require it," since an essential element for preclusion, actual litigation on
the merits, is missing. 1
58
154. As discussed more fully in Part V, Justice Stone's dissent in Yarborough rejected
strict application of full faith and credit. Yarborough, 290 U.S. at 222-27 (Stone, J., dis-
senting).
155. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-66, 769 (1989) (declining to give preclusive
effect to consent decree that settled employment practices with respect to black firefight-
ers as against nonparty white firefighters, but deciding the issue on joinder grounds); Local
Number 93, Int'l Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 478 U.S. 501, 529-30 (1986)
(permitting parties to resolve employment practices suit by consent decree, including is-
sues that were not susceptible to court adjudication, despite union's intervention and ob-
jection to unfairness of decree's impact on nonminority employees). But see Rufo v. In-
mates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367, 383-85, 393 (1992) (recognizing need for
flexibility in consent decrees arising out of "institutional reform litigation" and permitting
modification of decree under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) over objection of inmates).
156. See James, supra note 7, at 173-74; see also Note, The Consent Judgment as an In-
strument of Compromise and Settlement, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1314, 1314-15 (1959).
157. James, supra note 7, at 175.
158. Id. at 180 (emphasis removed).
Even where the parties have stipulated to the existence or nonexistence of cer-
tain facts and the judgment recites them expressly or by implication, the rules
governing collateral estoppel do not require that thes6 recitals be given binding
effect between the parties subsequently pursuing different claims and demands
against each other. We have seen that if the parties' agreement is construed to
embrace such a binding effect their intent to be bound will generally be given ef-
fect; but this is by virtue of the contractual aspect of the matter. The point here
made is that if the agreement is not construed to call for such binding effect, then
the rules pertaining to judgments do not require it. This is so because the parties
have not fully contested such an issue; they have agreed upon it instead of sub-
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In urging caution when inferring preclusive intent, Professor James
was concerned primarily with attempts to use consent judgments to cre-
ate binding consequences for parties to tort actions and their insurers, a
type of third party issue that existed more often before the expansion of
the definition of "privies."'5 9 Several states,' including Michigan,' have
adopted and continue to apply Professor James's limitations on the pre-
clusive effects of consent judgments. Additionally, the Supreme Court
has in one instance declined to assume issue preclusion created by con-
sent judgment, rejecting the argument of a private individual who at-
tempted to bind the Federal Government to the depreciation basis used
in a prior consent decree to determine his tax liability in future years."'
Although not addressing directly the Baker case situation, which raises
questions about the permissible effects of a consent judgment on the in-
terests of true nonparties, Professor James's analysis is important be-
cause it demonstrates, from the standpoint of traditional preclusion law,
that it is not necessary for courts to give consent judgments the same pre-
clusive effects as litigated judgments. Even though his analysis centered
on the procedural prerequisites for issue or claim preclusion, Professor
James implicitly recognized that it may not be appropriate to equate con-
sensual and litigated judgments.
In recent years, commentators have raised other concerns about pre-
clusion by consent judgments, focusing more directly on the fairness of
the outcome and the effects on nonparties, also referred to as third par-
ties."' The debate frequently focuses on public interest litigation, such as
mitting it to the tribunal for determination.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
159. See id. at 189-92. But see Continental Cas. Co. v. Westerfield, 961 F. Supp. 1502,
1509 (D.N.M.), affd sub noma Continental Cas. Co. v. Hempel, 108 F.3d 274 (10th Cir.
1997) (finding a settlement agreement and stipulated judgment collusive and denying pre-
clusive effect, but noting that nonparty insurers are still bound by their obligations).
160. See Shapiro, supra note 132, at 1183-87 (noting representative cases from several
states declining grant of preclusive effect to consent judgments).
161. See American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Co., 235 N.W.2d 769,
776 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975) ("Nothing is adjudicated between two parties to a consent
judgment."); see also infra Part V.B (analyzing Justice Kennedy's concurrence and empha-
sizing his "first step" analysis focusing on Michigan law).
162. See United States v. International Bldg. Co., 345 U.S. 502, 505-06 (1953) (holding
parties' consent decree for tax liability in years 1933, 1938 and 1939 was not determinative
of depreciation of property for 1943-45 and questioning scope and motivation for settle-
ment).
163. In 1987, The University of Chicago Legal Forum hosted an important symposium
entitled Consent Decrees: Practical Problems and Legal Dilemmas, which was documented
in its 1987 journal issue. See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, Justice Chicago Style, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 1, 1-4 (noting the problems and dangers of consent decrees); Resnik, supra note
6, at 44 (questioning the proper role of the judge during negotiation and entry of consent
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class actions, in which Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 obligates the
court to review the fairness of at least some aspects of any settlement or
dismissal.'6 Some commentators believe the review process is inade-
quate. For example, there is criticism that absent class members may
not be represented fairly,' 66 that the F-1 court may be motivated to mini-
mize third persons' concerns due to a desire to relieve overcrowded
dockets and efficiently resolve cases, 67 and that consent judgments often
enshrine unequal bargaining positions. 168 Other commentary has specifi-
cally focused on the unlikelihood that the F-1 court can identify nonparty
interests, as consent judgments are drafted and presented solely from the
viewpoint of the settling parties.169 These concerns have led some com-
mentators to urge adoption of new procedures to govern or restrict the
entry of consent judgments by trial courts. 70 In addition, as demon-
strated by the history of the ElwelI/GM consent judgment, recent litiga-
tion practices generate reasons for concern about the appropriate scope
decrees). But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 19, 19-21, 30-31, 34 (considering consent decrees attractive alternative
settlement tools, although admitting that affected third parties may deserve access to a
safety valve in the form of permissible collateral attack rules).
164. See FED. R. CIv. P. 23(e) (providing that a class action will "not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court").
165. See Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L.
REV. 1051, 1053-57, 1122-23, 1280 (1996) (discussing abuse of court approved settlements
in class actions, criticizing "facade of estoppel" and judges who approve unfair settle-
ments, finding wholly inadequate the review procedures under current Rule 23, and con-
cluding, only partly in jest that the only solution is to sue the lawyers responsible for cer-
tain consent decrees). See generally Larry Kramer, Consent Decrees and the Rights of
Third Parties, 87 MICH. L. REV. 321 (1988) (criticizing the current system of review);
Richard A. Epstein, Wilder v. Bernstein: Squeeze Play by Consent Decree, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 209 (analyzing the fairness of consent decrees through an analysis of Wilder v.
Berstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)).
166. See Laycock, supra note 24, at 103-04 (proposing that courts should be prohibited
from approving consent decrees unless participation and consent of all affected parties are
secured).
167. See Resnik, supra note 6, at 101 (noting the mixed role of the judge in many class
action settlements in pressing litigants for settlements and ruling on the fairness of the
agreements formed).
168. See Fiss, supra note 163, at 2, 4 (noting that "[s]ettlements are especially likely to
reflect the inequalities of power and resources that the parties bring to the bargaining ta-
ble .... [C]onsent decrees are in one important respect worse than purely contractual set-
tlements. This defect arises from the fact that they constitute an appropriation of a public
power.").
169. See Resnik, supra note 6, at 101 (concluding that "judges cannot, absent conflict,
determine much about the legality or the quality of the compromises made").
170. See Kramer, supra note 165, at 323-24 (proposing replacement of the collateral
attack bar with the consolidation of third party claims and use of consent proceedings);
Laycock, supra note 24, at 104 (proposing that consent decrees that affect third persons be
subject to unilateral consent or be nonbinding upon such individuals).
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of interjurisdictional preclusion for consent judgments. At the time of
Elwell's suit, GM had two overlapping problems: an ex-employee who
wanted more money, and a multitude of plaintiffs across the United
States who were claiming GM's engine designs were defective in ways
the ex-employee seemed eager to describe. Certainly, there were privi-
leged aspects to Elwell's knowledge, as some of his information was gen-
erated by his role as a member of the GM attorney defense team in prior
tort cases.' GM understandably wished to prevent, once and for all,
Elwell from testifying and thereby disclosing confidential or privileged
information. Litigating the privilege issues in each of the product liabil-
ity cases undoubtedly seemed risky to GM, not to mention expensive.
Because Elwell appeared willing to concede the privileged nature of his
knowledge, or at least willing to do so if paid enough money, GM seized
upon the most direct route to capture this concession by writing a broad,
final order prohibiting all testimony.
The Baker litigation may represent a different breed of consent judg-
ments than was encountered by the Supreme Court in early cases such as
Yarborough. The ElwellI/GM consent judgment represents a distinct in-
stance in which at least one party intended to affect the important inter-
ests of nonparties across the nation, even if GM was technically correct in
its denial of an attempt to "bind" these nonparties. A mere settlement
agreement binding Elwell was unsatisfactory to the corporation. GM's
goal was the tremendous and positive impact a binding consent judgment
would have on its troublesome product liability suits. This goal empha-
sizes the nonjudicial role of the judge in consent judgments generally,
which in turn suggests caution is appropriate in assigning such judgments
interstate effectiveness. For example, by comparison, the Supreme
Court has declined to treat unconfirmed arbitration awards as "judicial
proceedings" for purposes of full faith and credit. As modern consent
judgments become increasingly concerned with third party claims and,
arguably, seek to manipulate these interests, it may be that the tradition
of treating litigated judgments and consent judgments as the same for
purposes of full faith and credit requires reconsideration.
171. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing stipulations of the El-
well/GM parties).
172. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 287-88 (1984) ("Arbitration
is not a 'judicial proceeding' and, therefore, § 1738 does not apply to arbitration awards.");
see also University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794, 798-99 (1986) (holding issue pre-
clusion for state administrative proceedings is not required by Full Faith and Credit Act,
but by federal common law preclusion policies).
173. See infra note 195 (discussing oral argument in Baker that emphasized the need to
distinguish consent decrees from litigated judgments). A dilemma, however, may exist for
1999]
Catholic University Law Review
The Elwell/GM consent judgment cannot be excused or described as
an anomaly, for within months of the Supreme Court's attempt in Baker
to resolve the national interests of F-2 courts in deciding their own dis-
putes, the next generation of consent judgment problems appeared on
the horizon. For instance, a New Jersey federal district court already has
rejected the decision of Baker v. General Motors as controlling the pre-
clusive effect of a New Jersey consent judgment on multistate proceed-
ings involving attorney-client privilege and a former employee's appear-
ance at a deposition in Florida for use in California-based insurance
litigation.
17 1
In discussing Justice Ginsburg's important decision and its implications
for interjurisdictional preclusion generally, this Article notes instances
where the Court's analysis seems influenced by the "nonjudicial" nature
of the Michigan judgment. As the Court attempts to identify appropriate
limitations on full faith and credit, it may be overlooking an opportunity
to identify, or at least to discuss, appropriate limitations on consent
judgments.
IV. THE HEART OF THE MATFER: JUSTICE GINSBURG'S MAJORITY
OPINION
Certiorari was granted "to decide whether the full faith and credit re-
quirement stop[ped] the Bakers, who were not parties to the Michigan
proceeding, from obtaining Elwell's testimony in their Missouri wrongful
death action." ' Despite the relatively settled nature of the principles of
full faith and credit for judgments, this case was the second in two years
counsel or judges who view this distinction from the standpoint of substantive ideology.
For example, a lawyer who may be concerned about the rights of the Bakers and similarly
situated plaintiffs faced with an evidentiary "ruling" regarding a matter that they had
never argued, may at the same time represent minority interests in other cases, and thus
may wish to argue that consent decrees should be permitted to have enforceable "effects"
on nonparties. Compare the roles of plaintiffs' counsel in Baker v. General Motors, 118 S.
Ct. 657 (1998), with the roles of the black firefighters' counsel in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755 (1989).
174. See Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Nelson, 11 F. Supp. 2d 572, 582 (D.N.J.
1998). The court in Nelson rejected the application of the Baker holding to the issue of
enforcement of a New Jersey consent decree which, in settling an employment dispute,
purported to prohibit privileged testimony by the corporation's former attorney. See id.
at 579-80. The court permitted modification of the consent decree despite the fact that
individuals who were challenging effects of the decree were nonparties to the decree, were
involved in California litigation against insurers, and were seeking the Florida deposition.
See id. at 582.
175. Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 663. The Court further noted the conflict between the Eighth
Circuit and "many other lower courts [that had] permitted Elwell to testify as to non-
privileged and non-trade-secret matters." Id. at 663 n.2.
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to be accepted for Court review that involved "judgments" created by
settlement.
7 6
Justice Ginsburg's analysis began with a historical look at the purpose
of full faith and credit, embodied in Article IV, Section 1 of the Constitu-
tion and the Full Faith and Credit Act, and she noted cases that de-
scribed it as a necessary component of the federalized system of govern-
ment.'" The opinion noted the distinction between the relatively weak
credit given by the Court to legislative measures and common law178 and
the much stronger mandate as to judgments:
Regarding judgments, however, the full faith and credit obli-
gation is exacting. A final judgment in one State, if rendered by
a court with adjudicatory authority over the subject matter and
persons governed by the judgment, qualifies for recognition
throughout the land. For claim and issue preclusion (res judi-
cata) purposes, in other words, the judgment of the rendering
State gains nationwide force. 9
The opinion undoubtedly dashed the hopes of individuals concerned
about same-sex marriage issues, who were looking for specific recogni-
tion of a public policy .exception under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.
The majority concluded, "our decisions support no roving 'public policy
exception' to the full faith and credit due judgments."' 80 The Supreme
Court clearly was aware of scholarship that criticized the use of public




176. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 375 (1996). The role of
Justice Ginsburg as the author of the majority decision in Baker was perhaps not surpris-
ing, given her history of teaching and scholarship in the area. See generally Ruth Gins-
burg, Judgments in Search of Full Faith and Credit: The Last-in-Time Rule for Conflicting
Judgments, 82 HARV. L. REV. 798 (1969) (examining the state of the law regarding the
effect that judgments should be given in subsequent legal proceedings).
177. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 663; cf Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (noting full
faith and credit "substituted a command for the earlier principles of comity and thus basi-
cally altered the status of the States as independent sovereigns"); Milwaukee County v. M.
E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935) (stating that the Full Faith and Credit Clause's
purpose was integration of the states into a "single nation").
178. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 663 (quoting Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Indus. Acci-
dent Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939)).
179. Id. at 663-4 (footnote omitted).
180. Id. at 664. The opinion further notes that the district court misread Supreme
Court precedent in basing its decision not to enforce the Michigan injunction on the public
policy of Missouri favoring full discovery. See id.
181. See id. at 664 n.6. (citing Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I. Sovern, "Public Policy"
in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969, 980-81 (1956)); see also Reynolds, supra
note 80, at 438-39 (criticizing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS' public policy
exception to full faith and credit).
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With similar boldness, the majority stated that no specific exception to
full faith and credit should be accorded to injunctive relief generally:""
"The Court has never placed equity decrees outside the full faith and
credit domain.' ' 183 For traditional preclusive effect to be granted a final
judgment, the Court saw no reason why a judgment affecting "parties
and those 'in privity' with them" should differ because of the legal or eq-
uitable nature of the relief granted.' 4
The opinion's opening description of full faith and credit principles,
almost textbook in nature, initially must have been heartening to GM.
Justice Ginsburg's next statement, on the other hand, was the point of
departure from traditional discussions of full faith and credit:
Full faith and credit, however, does not mean that States
must adopt the practices of other States regarding the time,
manner, and mechanisms for enforcing judgments. Enforce-
ment measures do not travel with the sister state judgment as
preclusive effects do; such measures remain subject to the even-
handed control of forum law.'
In articulating a distinction between the obligation to give "credit" to a
foreign judgment, and the non-obligation to "enforce" the judgment, the
opinion cited no direct precedent, but provided what Ginsburg viewed as
examples of the distinction drawn from past cases:
Orders commanding action or inaction have been denied en-
forcement in a sister State when they purported to accomplish
an official act within the exclusive province of that other State
or interfered with litigation over which the ordering State had
no authority. Thus, a sister State's decree concerning land
ownership in another State has been held ineffective to transfer
title, although such a decree may indeed preclusively adjudicate
the rights and obligations running between the parties to the
foreign litigation. And antisuit injunctions regarding litigation
elsewhere, even if compatible with due process as a direction
constraining parties to the decree, in fact have not controlled
182. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 665. The Court noted, however, that antisuit injunctions
were a separate issue from equitable relief generally, citing Donovan v. Dallas, 377 U.S.
408 (1964), which held that the full faith and credit statute was inapplicable to a state
court's attempt to enjoin a federal case. See id. at 665 n.9. The Court also implied that the
Full Faith and Credit Clause may not be used to enforce state courts' attempts to enjoin
other states' proceedings. See id.
183. Id. at 664.
184. Id. But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, supra note 23, § 102 (de-
scribing the courts' obligation to enforce sister state equitable decrees only as permissive,
not mandatory).
185. Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 665.
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the second court's actions regarding litigation in that court.
Sanctions for violations of an injunction, in any event, are gen-
erally administered by the court that issued the injunction." '
None of the cases cited by Ginsburg in support of the above passage
involved the effects of a judgment on nonparties.' 87 However, the hold-
ing of the majority in Baker also rested on the implications of the Elwell-
GM judgment for nonparties.
As discussed above, the traditional analysis of full faith and credit, as a
Constitution-based principle for enforcement of judgments, has been tied
closely to the common law development of claim preclusion and issue
preclusion principles.8' Ginsburg recognized that "claim preclusion" was
created by the Michigan .consent judgment, thus validly binding Elwell
and GM to their bargain.8 9 However, the opinion rejected the use of is-
sue preclusion principles to resolve the question of whether the consent
judgment permissibly affected or impermissibly attempted to bind the
Bakers. 90 Citing Martin v. Wilks, the majority concluded that one state's
judgment cannot be used to control litigation in other courts, at least not
if that litigation involves new parties.'9
[A] Michigan court cannot, by entering the injunction to
which Elwell and GM stipulated, dictate to a court in another
jurisdiction that evidence relevant in the Bakers' case-a con-
troversy to which Michigan is foreign-shall be inadmissible....
[W]e simply recognize that, just as the mechanisms for enforc-
ing a judgment do not travel with the judgment itself for pur-
poses of Full Faith and Credit, and just as one State's judgment
186. Id. (citations and footnotes omitted).
187. See id. (citing Robertson v. Howard, 229 U.S. 254 (1913) (rights between parties
in a foreign suit); Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909) (land title transfer); Cole v. Cunning-
ham, 133 U.S. 107 (1890) (antisuit injunctions affecting parties); James v. Grand Trunk
Western R. Co., 152 N.E.2d 858 (Il. 1958) (same)).
188. See supra Part III.A (discussing the principles of claim and issue preclusion).
189. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 666 ("While no issue was joined, expressly litigated, and
determined in the Michigan proceeding, that order is claim preclusive between Elwell and
GM. Elwell's claim for wrongful discharge and his related contract and tort claims have
'merged in the judgment,' and he cannot sue again to recover more." (footnote omitted)).
190. See id. at 666 n.11.
In no event, we have observed, can issue preclusion be invoked against one who
did not participate in the prior adjudication .... [Nonetheless,] GM adds, the
Michigan decree does not bind the Bakers; it binds Elwell only .... [I]t is clear
that issue preclusion principles, standing alone, cannot resolve the controversy
GM presents.
Id.
191. See id. at 666 (citing Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761-63 (1989)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, supra note 23, §§ 137-39 (setting forth the prin-
ciple that the law of the forum controls evidentiary principles).
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cannot automatically transfer title to land in another State,
similarly the Michigan decree cannot determine evidentiary is-
sues in a lawsuit brought by parties who were not subject to the
jurisdiction of the Michigan court.192
Thus, despite the majority's resistance to the Bakers' use of due proc-
ess language, as demonstrated during oral argument, the essence of the
Bakers' argument appears to have been accepted; there is something
fundamentally wrong with a judgment that attempts to affect, if not bind,
the essential interests of nonparties, thereby placing the judgment out-
side the protection of full faith and credit.
The majority attempted to prevent mischaracterization of its holding,
and to respond to the criticism of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion,
by denying it was recognizing a public policy exception to full faith and
credit. "This conclusion creates no general exception to the full faith and
credit command, and surely does not permit a State to refuse to honor a
sister state judgment based on the forum's choice of law or policy prefer-
ences."
193
Although it did not state so specifically, the majority appeared to as-
sume that, based on its decision in Matsushita,94 consent judgments are
entitled to the same full faith and credit given to litigated judgments.
The Bakers did not advocate that an exception to full faith and credit
should be created for consent judgments, an understandable position,
particularly given the modern history of expansion of preclusive effects
given to judgments generally and the criticism of anything which "smells"
like another public policy exception.' 9' The Supreme Court did not ex-
192. Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 667 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
193. Id. at 667.
Justice Kennedy inexplicably reads into our decision a sweeping exception to full
faith and credit based solely on "the integrity of Missouri's judicial processes."
The Michigan judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit, we have endeav-
ored to make plain, because it impermissibly interferes with Missouri's control of
litigation brought by parties who were not before the Michigan court.
Id. at 667 n.12 (citations omitted).
194. 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
195. During oral argument of Baker, Chief Justice Rehnquist initiated the questioning
by asking for a definition of consent decrees and Justice Ginsburg followed by making the
observation that in this particular case, "nothing was ever actually litigated," thus elimi-
nating the possibility of issue preclusion. Transcript at 3-6. Were these exchanges a signal
that the justices were willing to deny or limit interjurisdictional enforcement of the Michi-
gan consent decree because of its "consensual" nature? In an attempt to answer this ques-
tion, the author of this article contacted Professor Tribe, counsel for the Bakers. He
kindly and quickly responded in writing by electronic mail. Although explaining he did
not have the time to study the transcript of oral argument in order to respond to my letter,
he stated it was his recolkIztion that the questions may have been an attempt to goad him
[48:419
Common Law Preclusion
pressly address this issue, despite a provocative question by one justice
during oral argument.196 Nonetheless, it seems evident that the consen-
sual nature of the order, in that it was written as a complete ban on tes-
timony and was virtually rubber-stamped by the court, was a factor that
influenced the Court's ruling. Justice Ginsburg, in describing the history
of the Elwell-GM consent judgment, specifically noted the nonadversar-
ial setting of the final order, including the "new" judge's role in merely
signing the parties' stipulated injunction.""
V. IMPLICATIONS
In many ways, particularly with the benefit of hindsight, the Baker
ruling appears straightforward. The Court simply refused to permit the
full faith and credit command to be used in a manner that would turn a
consent judgment into an evidentiary sword against nonparties. Obvi-
ously, the analysis was less than simple for the lower courts in Baker, and
consent judgments have proven difficult for courts analyzing the impact
on third parties in other contexts. 98
into taking a weak position. He wrote,
I recall ... that the Chief Justice in particular was trying to goad me into making
our position rest on the non-litigated nature of that judgment, with the obvious if
unstated premise that, since all consent decrees are by definition non-litigated
judgment, any argument that would deny otherwise applicable full faith and
credit to a judgment simply because it was consensual would be radically incon-
sistent with the Court's jurisprudence and would wreck havoc with the law.
Electronic correspondence from Lawrence Tribe, Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Consti-
tutional Law, Harvard Law School (May 20, 1998) (on file with author). Thus, it appears
that Professor Tribe personally rejects making a distinction in enforcement for non-
litigated decrees, and further, made a strategic decision during oral argument of the Bak-
ers' case not to request limitations based on the "consensual" nature of the Michigan set-
tlement-based decree. Professor Tribe's position seems particularly understandable given
his strong support for civil rights, since it seems likely that he would usually favor broad
enforcement of certain consent decrees, such as the decree negotiated by the black fire-
fighters in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). See also discussion supra note 173.
196. An unidentified justice, possibly Justice Souter, inquired whether the enforce-
ment answer would be different if the judgment was the result of a fully litigated claim
rather than a settlement.
What if the Michigan court had litigated the issue of privilege as between Elwell
and General Motors.. . and had concluded that information about subject X was
privileged, and [the court] made that determination and then said,... you can't
disclose that, Mr. Elwell, anywhere, anytime. Is that [decision] entitled to full
faith and credit when Elwell is called then as a witness in another jurisdiction?
Transcript at 25.
197. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 661-62 & n.1; see supra Part III.C (discussing jurisdictional
preclusion).
198. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 11 F. Supp. 2d 572 (D.N.J. 1998) (discuss-
ing California, Florida, and New Jersey interests in determining privilege issues, and tak-
ing the lead as the court which issued the consent judgment to protect a corporation which
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At Part III of this Article, six approaches to full faith and credit issues
were identified, and at least four of these theories had substantial sup-
port in prior court decisions. Justice Ginsburg's decision, however,
fashioned a different approach, which appears to merge individual due
process and institutional concerns. This seventh approach to full faith
and credit can be summarized as follows:
7. Ginsburg's Ruling in Baker v. General Motors: A distinction exists,
for purposes of full faith and credit, between recognition and the me-
chanics of judgment enforcement, arising out of the historical power of
all F-2 jurisdictions to control their own judicial proceedings. Therefore,
F-2 courts may decline to enforce an F-1 order when two factors are pre-
sent: (a) the F-1 judgment attempts to affect the course of F-2's control
over its own litigation and (b) the F-1 judgment, if enforced, would affect
the important interest of someone who was not a party to F-1.19
Questions about interjurisdictional enforcement, arising in recent cases
such as Martin v. Wilks, Matsushita, and Baker, reflect surprisingly persis-
tent confusion about the sources of any defenses or exceptions to full
faith and credit. Justice Ginsburg's opinion appears to be an effort to or-
ganize some of the past decisions,20° in which courts have refused to re-
quire interjurisdictional enforcement of judgments, into a coherent, sin-
gle theory. As such, the Baker decision seems to articulate a national
vision of a federalized system for the dispensing of justice, and thus the
question becomes whether section 103 of the Restatement (Second) of
Conflict of Laws, already captures this principle.
A. New Life for Section 103? Justice Ginsburg's Non-Roving Public
Policy Exception
There has been a long debate among commentators about the correct-
had a strong interest in preventing its former attorney from testifying); Continental Cas.
Co. v. Westerfield, 961 F. Supp. 1502 (D.N.M. 1997) (discussing nonenforcement of argua-
bly collusive stipulated facts in consent judgment against nonparty insurers).
199. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 665-68; see also, e.g., MOORE, supra note 149, § 130.02, at
5 (Current Developments Supp., Sept. 1998) (summarizing the Baker holding: "One
state's judgment cannot reach beyond controversy resolved by that judgment to control
proceedings brought in other states, by other parties, asserting claims merits of which ren-
dering state has not considered.").
200. The three strands of cases that Ginsburg's decision treats as providing precedent
include the right of F-2 forums not to enforce F-1 decrees regarding title to F-2 property,
as in Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909), the right of F-2 forums to resist certain F-1 anti suit
injunctions, as in James v. Grand Trunk Western R.R. Co., 152 N.E.2d 858 (1958), and the
right of an F-2 forum to award workers compensation benefits which supplement an ad-
ministrative award in another state, as in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S.
261 (1980) (plurality opinion).
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ness of public policy exceptions to full faith and credit.0 I Sides have been
chosen by writers who assign importance to a national goal of interstate
enforcement of judgments and those who discount as imaginary the hor-
rors of second-guessed rulings among the sister states. Those urging the
need for a strong national policy of finality rely on Fauntleroy v. Lum.2 °O
In Fauntleroy, the Supreme Court applied the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to require Mississippi to enforce the judgment of a Missouri
court, despite the fact that this would require Mississippi to give effect to
a debt arising out of a gambling transaction deemed illegal under Missis-
sippi law: "[Tihe judgment [of Missouri] cannot be impeached in Missis-
sippi even if it went upon a misapprehension of the Mississippi law."
203
The holding of Fauntleroy is reflected in section 117 of the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts of Laws:
A valid judgment rendered in one State of the United States
will be recognized and enforced in a sister State even though
the strong public policy of the latter State would have precluded
recovery in its courts on the original claim.
The comments to section 117 use the Fauntleroy case as an illustration
of the principle rejecting local public policy as a proper basis for avoiding
the full faith and credit command. Justice Ginsburg was correct in mak-
ing the observation that the federal district court in Baker misread the
Supreme Court's precedent in permitting the local concern for full dis-
covery to be weighed against Michigan's interest in enforcement of its
judgment. 2°' As commentators have observed, "[t]he most troublesome
use of public policy comes when it is employed as a cloak for the selec-
tion of local law to govern a transaction having important local con-
tacts. '' 26 This parochial weighing or balancing of competing state inter-
ests was exactly the action the Supreme Court sought to avoid in
deciding Fauntleroy.
However, section 103 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of Laws
articulates the possibility that an exception to full faith and credit exists
that is subtle in its difference from section 117. The exception, perhaps
unnecessarily vague in the form contained in the Restatement, appears to
recognize a role for the Supreme Court in determining what concerns, in
201. See, e.g., RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 105, at ch. 5; Reynolds, supra note
80, at 436-38.
202. 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
203. Id. at 237.
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICrs, supra note 23, § 117.
205. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 664 (1998).
206. Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 181, at 1016.
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a national system of jurisprudence, override a general policy in favor of
full faith and credit for judgments:
A judgment rendered in one State of the United States need
not be recognized or enforced in a sister State if such recogni-
tion or enforcement is not required by the national policy of full
faith and credit because it would involve an improper interfer-
ence with [*] important interests of the sister State.•
Perhaps a more helpful statement of the exception would exist if the
words "nationally recognized important interests of the sister States"
were inserted beginning at the asterisk above and substituted for the bal-
ance of the original clause.
The genesis of this provision was Justice Stone's dissenting opinion in
Yarborough v. Yarborough. 8 In that case, a father was a party to a
Georgia judgment, in the form of a consent decree, settling all remaining
issues with his wife arising out of their divorce. He had satisfied the
judgment by payment of a specific sum in child support, or "alimony" as
the term was used in the decree. The father asserted that his daughter's
subsequent direct action for additional support, filed in the courts of her
new domicile of South Carolina, was barred by the existence of the prior
final order. In support of his position, he cited the doctrine of res judi-
cata, as enforced in the interstate context by the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.2°
The majority accepted the father's full faith and credit argument, rul-
ing that the father "has fulfilled the duty which he owes [the daughter] by
the law of his domicile and the judgment of its court. Upon that judg-
ment he is entitled to rely.",210 Thus, full faith and credit was held to ap-
ply "to an unalterable decree of alimony for a divorced wife. The clause
applies, likewise, to an unalterable decree of alimony for a minor
child."
, 2"
Justice Stone, however, thought the daughter was entitled to pursue
her separate suit under the law of South Carolina, her new state of domi-
cile. 2 Citing several cases in which full faith and credit was denied be-
cause of the important interests in separate adjudication which existed in
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, supra note 23. § 103.
208. 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
209. See id. at 209-10.
210. Id. at 212.
211. Id. at 212-13.
212. See id. at 224-25 (Stone, J., dissenting). At the time of its decision in the daugh-
ter's suit, South Carolina recognized a specific obligation of a father, enforceable by a
child's direct action, to provide support in the circumstances claimed by the daughter. See
id. at 223-24 (Stone, J., dissenting).
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what would now be described as "F-2" states, Justice Stone made this ob-
servation:
Whatever may be said of the local interest which was
deemed controlling in those cases in which this Court has de-
nied to a state judgment the same force and effect outside the
state as is given to it at home, it would not seem open to serious
question that every state has an interest in securing the mainte-
nance and support of minor children residing within its own ter-
ritory so complete and so vital to the performance of its func-
tions as a government, that no other state could set limits upon
it.213
Thus, Justice Stone contended there would, on occasion, be a need for
the Supreme Court to identify important interests of the states in con-
trolling the outcome of their local disputes. Therefore, he believed in
this case it was appropriate for South Carolina to award support for the
care of its citizens, without regard to Georgia's interest in her citizens:
The [majority's decision in Yarborough] extends the opera-
tion of the full faith and credit clause beyond its proper function
of affording protection to the domestic interests of Georgia and
makes it an instrument for encroachment by Georgia upon the
domestic concerns of South Carolina. 4
As the comments to section 103 of the Restatement emphasize, this ex-
ception "has an extremely narrow scope of application" for any other in-
terpretation would permit the exception to swallow the rule.21 ' The
commentary further states that it is for the Supreme Court to determine
the application of this rare exception, thus presumably restricting appli-
cation to circumstances reflecting a national view of the interests at
stake."6
Many commentators believe that the application of this exception ap-
plies, at most, to a few fact-bound cases arising in the context of domestic
2
21relations and, perhaps, workers' compensation. Most recently, sec-
tion 103 appeared to find support in the plurality decision of Thomas v.
Washington Gas Light Co. 21 9 In Thomas, an employer asserted that un-
der the Full Faith and Credit Act, a Virginia Industrial Commission
award of compensation was res judicata, barring the worker from making
213. Id. at 225 (J. Stone, dissenting).
214. Id. at 227 (J. Stone, dissenting).
215. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, supra note 23, § 103 cmt. a.
216. See id. § 103, cmt. b.
217. See RiCHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 105, § 114[b], at 353-54.
218. See id. § 114[c], at 354-55.
219. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
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a claim for supplemental benefits in the District of Columbia.220 At-
tempting to resolve the conflicting decisions of Magnolia Petroleum Co.
v. Hun?21 and Industrial Commission of Wisconsin v. McCartin,"2 the
four-member plurality opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, cited Justice
Stone's dissent in Yarborough and held:
We simply conclude that the substantial interests of the sec-
ond State in these circumstances should not be overridden by
another State through an unnecessarily aggressive application
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, as was implictly recognized
at the time of McCartin. We therefore would hold that a State
has no legitimate interest within the context of our federal sys-
tem in preventing another State from granting a supplemental
compensation award when that second State would have had
the power to apply its workmen's compensation law in the first
instance. The Full Faith and Credit Clause should not be con-
strued to preclude successive workmen's compensation
awards.23
Exactly how to characterize the plurality decision in Thomas v. Wash-
ington Gas Light Co. has generated considerable attention, including
some attempts to limit its precedential value to workers compensation
224cases.
In Baker v. General Motors, however, Justice Ginsburg's decision
seems to define more clearly the separation between prohibited public
220. See id. at 266.
221. 320 U.S. 430 (1943) (prohibiting a sister state's award of additional worker com-
pensation).
222. 330 U.S. 622 (1947) (permitting a sister state's award of additional worker com-
pensation).
223. Thomas, 448 U.S. at 285-86 (footnote omitted) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion).
224. See, e.g., RICHMAN & REYNOLDS, supra note 105, § 114[c][3] & [4], at 356-59
(criticizing rationale of plurality opinion); Paige E. Chabora, Congress' Power Under the
Full Faith and Credit Clause and the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 76 NEB. L. REV.
604, 650 (1997) (citing Thomas as evidence that the question is open as to whether Con-
gress can cut back on the amount of full faith and credit mandated by the Supreme Court);
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Linda J. Silberman, Interjurisdictional Implications of the
Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 123, 148 n.120 (1996) (recognizing that
Thomas has been severely criticized); Reynolds, supra note 80, at 446-47 (characterizing
the plurality opinion as an "interest balancing" approach); Mark Strasser, Judicial Good
Faith and the Baehr Essentials: On Giving Credit Where It's Due, 28 RUTGERS L.J. 313,
316 (1997) (citing Thomas for the principle that the Supreme Court wants rights recog-
nized in a given state to be recognized nationally); Germaine Winnick Willett, Note,
Equality Under the Law or Annihilation of Marriage and Morals? The Same-Sex Marriage
Debate, 73 IND. L.J. 355, 378-79 (1997) (construing the plurality opinion as supporting the
position that full faith and credit does not require one State to substitute for its own stat-
ute an analogous, yet conflicting, statute).
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policy concerns under section 117 and acceptable public policy concerns
under section 103. Her decision characterized the Michigan state consent
judgment as an attempt to reach beyond the ElweI/GM dispute and "to
control proceedings against GM brought in other States, by other parties,
asserting claims the merits of which Michigan has not considered. 25 An
exception to full faith and credit based on the F-1 judgment's attempt to
control F-2 proceedings is different than a local public policy exception
based on F-2's rejection of an F-1 ruling based on F-2's substantive law.
By recognizing a national interest in the integrity of all states and all
courts to decide their own evidentiary questions, subject to the guidance
of precedent rather than the mandate of full faith and credit, the Su-
preme Court appears to have demonstrated an appropriate, modern ap-
plication for section 103.226 Regardless of commentary which is critical of
section 103, it now appears evident that the Supreme Court is willing to
identify a national vision of overriding, legitimate state interests, and to
protect such interests from being impaired by mechanical application of
full faith and credit.
Whether it was the intention of Justice Ginsburg to craft a decision
that would cause a majority of the Court to utilize section 103 is, how-
ever, less clear.22 The majority decision cites the plurality opinion in
Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., for a key proposition which is con-
sistent with section 103:
In sum, Michigan has no authority to shield a witness from
another jurisdiction's subpoena power in a case involving per-
sons and causes outside Michigan's governance. Recognition,
under full faith and credit, is owed to dispositions Michigan has
authority to order. But a Michigan decree cannot command
obedience elsewheie on a matter the Michigan court lacks
225. Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 666 (1998).
226. The comments to Restatement section 103 indicate the provision is not applicable
to mandates or prohibitions created by final equitable orders.
The rule of this Section is not concerned with the enforcement of sister State
judgments that order the doing of an act other than the payment of money or
that enjoin the doing of an act. As stated in § 102, the enforcement of such [equi-
table relief] may not be required by full faith and credit.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS, supra note 23, § 103 cmt. a. However, Justice
Ginsburg, in refusing to base the decision in Baker on the injunctive nature of the Michi-
gan state court order, appears to have resolved this question about section 102. See Baker,
118 S. Ct. at 667-68.
227. The Bakers did not urge application of section 103, merely noting its distinction
from section 117's prohibition on local public policy exceptions. Petitioner's Brief, supra
note 36, at 24 n.17.
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228
authority to resolve.
However, the majority does not cite either section 103 or Justice
Stone's dissent in Yarborough, and it ignores the substantial commentary
which criticizes application of section 103. Thus, as Justice Kennedy sug-
gests,229 the precedent for the majority's refusal to require the Missouri
court to enforce the Michigan order is still somewhat vague and the ap-
plication to future cases uncertain.
One can anticipate that, consistent with Justice Kennedy's concern
about the implications of the majority's approach to full faith and credit,
the majority decision will be criticized for opening the doors to a flood of
policy-based arguments that could weaken the function of full faith and
credit. As a practical matter, given the strong, cautionary tone of the
majority decision, this result appears unlikely. But in the final analysis,
principles of preclusion, including full faith and credit, are based on pub-
lic policy; when preclusion is misapplied, it is not surprising that public
policy gives rise to limitations.3
Courts and counsel attempting to apply Baker v. General Motors must
address the further concern of Justice Kennedy that it was unnecessary
for the majority to create or recognize any exception to full faith and
credit. Therefore, it is necessary to re-examine the "first step" analysis
traditionally employed by the Supreme Court in approaching the appli-
cation of full faith and credit to judgments.
B. Is Justice Kennedy Right? No Claim Preclusion + No Issue Preclusion
= No Full Faith and Credit Concern
Justice Kennedy expressed concern that the majority had overlooked a
well-settled approach to full faith and credit, which required the Missouri
court, and all other courts faced with the prospect of affording preclusion
to Michigan's consent judgment, to give it only such credit as would the
228. Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 667-68 (citing Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S.
261,282-83 (1980)).
229. See id. at 669-70 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
230. Compare the commentary by Professors Paulsen and Sovern on the application of
public policy to choice of law, wherein they observe that "textwriters, language in the
cases, and the Restatement agree: the 'normal' operation of choice of law rules is subject to
a 'public policy' limitation," followed by their caution that the "principal vice of the public
policy concepts is that they provide a substitute for analysis. The concepts stand in the
way of careful thought, of discriminating distinctions, and of true policy development in
the conflict of laws." Paulsen & Sovern, supra note 181, at 969, 1016; see Federated Dep't.
Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) (enforcing doctrine of res judicata and not-
ing it serves a vital public interest beyond the local concerns of a particular case).
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Michigan court.23 ' He believed the majority's articulation of a distinction
between recognition and enforcement was "problematic" and potentially
created new theories by which some may seek to avoid final judgments.
23 2
Justice Kennedy's first step approach to analysis is supported by multi-
ple decisions of the Supreme Court 233 and, in particular, by Justice Gins-
burg's own approach to analysis of full faith and credit issues in Matsu-
shita: "I would not endeavor, as the Court does, to speak the first word
on the content of Delaware preclusion law. Instead, I would follow our
standard practice of remitting that issue for decision, in the first instance,
by the lower federal courts."2 34
Justice Kennedy addressed the Michigan law on preclusive effects as to
nonparties, despite his apparent belief that the majority, the parties, and
the Eighth Circuit had overlooked this argument.2 ' The concurring
opinion did not address the Michigan law which declines to imply issue
preclusive effects arising from consent judgments. In fact, both argu-
ments were made in the Bakers' reply brief, though not in a prominent
236fashion. The Michigan law on consent judgments further demonstrates
the relevance of a "first step" analysis to determine the scope of preclu-
sion as to parties and issues recognized by the rendering court.
In American Mutual Liability Insurance Co. v. Michigan Mutual Li-
ability Insurance Co.," a declaratory judgment action was filed regarding
the proper source of insurance to cover damages sustained by a trucking
company's driver who was injured while assisting in operations at a paper
company. At issue were the preclusive effects, if any, from a consent de-
cree used to settle the driver's tort action against the paper company on
the question of which company was the "employer" of the driver for
231. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 668-69 (Kennedy, J., concurring). "In my view the case is
controlled by well-settled full faith and credit principles which render the majority's ex-
tended analysis unnecessary and, with all due respect, problematic in some degree." Id.
232. See id. at 668-69. "My concern is that the majority," having stated the principle
which forbids a second State from questioning a judgment because of disagreement with
the holding, "proceeds to disregard it by announcing two broad exceptions.... As em-
ployed to resolve this case, . . . the exceptions to full faith and credit have a potential for
disrupting judgments, and this ought to give us considerable pause." Id. at 669.
233. See supra note 129 (citing cases in which state law regarding preclusion was con-
sidered).
234. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 388 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
235. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 671 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("Here the Court of Ap-
peals and both parties in their arguments before our Court seemed to embrace the as-
sumption that Michigan would apply the full force of its judgment to the Bakers.").
236. See Petitioner's Reply Brief, supra note 72, at 19.
237. 235 N.W.2d 769 (Mich. Ct. App. 1975).
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purposes of insurance coverage. Although the court assumed there was
sufficient mutuality among the parties for estoppel to apply, the court
nonetheless held that the consent decree had no collateral estoppel effect
because no factual issues were "actually adjudicated," and because the
judge's action in signing the final order was merely "ministerial" in na-
ture.238 "It follows that because the issues involved in the settled case
were not actually adjudicated, one of the prerequisites to giving a judg-
ment collateral estoppel effect is not satisfied.... Nothing is adjudicated
between two parties to a consent judgment., 239 In declining to give col-
lateral estoppel effect to the consent judgment, the court contrasted the
need to reduce "instances of costly litigation" with a rule that would pro-
vide "drastic consequences for settlements.
24
0
Because the application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
to consent judgments will in many cases be unforeseeable, con-
sent judgments may become less desirable, thus impeding and
embarrassing the settlement process. As Professor James puts
it: "Any rule which tends to assure contest rather than com-
promise ... probably tends, on balance, to increase rather than
decrease litigation.,
241
Nonetheless, although Michigan courts will not infer issue preclusion
from a consent judgment, they will recognize a broader preclusive effect
expressly created by the parties' agreement. The court noted that, "if the
parties intend that the settlement is to bind them on certain issues of fact,
and if this intention is reflected in the consent judgment, collateral es-
toppel will apply. The consent judgment involved here does not go so
far., 242 Thus, in the absence of specific factual stipulations incorporated
into the consent judgment, such a judgment creates no inference of issue
preclusion for the original parties under Michigan law.
Michigan courts have found it easy to extend this rule to prohibit the
parties from using consent judgments in an attempt to affect persons who
243were not a party to the agreement. In Peterson v. City of Lapeer, a
consent judgment between the city and a group of landowners, which de-
termined the residential character of a section of real estate, was held to
have no effect on a nonparty-owner's commercial use of property in-
238. See id. at 776.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 776-77.
241. Id. at 777 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Fleming James, Jr., Consent Judgments as
Collateral Estoppel, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 173,185 (1959)).
242. Id. at 776 n.13 (citation omitted).
243. 307 N.W.2d 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
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cluded within the stipulation. The Michigan Court of Appeals noted,
"[tihe consent judgment entered into between the City of Lapeer and de-
fendants is not binding on these plaintiffs or upon the trial court. 2 44 This
case suggests that stipulations of the parties contained in a decree are
binding only on the parties. Thus, Justice Kennedy's concern that de-
termination of Michigan law is an important first step in approaching the
application of full faith and credit seems justified on more than one basis.
Justice Ginsburg responded to Justice Kennedy's concern by noting
that Michigan's common law preclusion principles fail to resolve GM's
contention that there is no intent to bind the Bakers and similar claim-
ants, but only to bind Elwell to his agreement and the dictates of a judg-
ment. It is true that the Michigan cases cited by Justice Kennedy,246 and
the intermediate court of appeal cases from Michigan regarding the ef-
fects of consent judgments,247 do not address the precise issue of whether
persons who are "merely affected" by an F-1 judgment may avoid those
effects by requiring the F-1 judgment to satisfy necessary elements for
claim and issue preclusion.
On the other hand, a careful reading of the injunctive relief and con-
sent judgment cases from Michigan supports a conclusion that Michigan
courts would not be persuaded by GM's characterization of the El-
well/GM agreement. The Michigan courts, in resisting the modern
trends and continuing to require mutuality and "actual litigation" of is-
sues as prerequisites for estoppel, clearly are sensitive to the potential for
the interests of nonparties that may be compromised by wide-ranging
consensual or litigated judgments. At a minimum, if there is to be fidel-
ity to the Supreme Court's jurisprudence requiring the F-2 court to ex-
amine the F-1 state's preclusion law, it would seem appropriate-if frus-
trating to the Bakers-for the Supreme Court to have remanded the
Baker case for determination by the federal district court of the impact of
Michigan preclusion law. 8
244. Id. at 748; see Berar Enters., Inc. v. Harmon, 300 N.W.2d 519, 523 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980) (holding a consent judgment not binding "where the party against whom [it] was
sought to be enforced did not agree to its entry").
245. See Baker v. General Motors Corp., 118 S. Ct. 657, 666 n.11 (1998).
246. See id. at 671-72 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
247. See Peterson v. City of Lapeer, 307 N.W.2d 744 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981); American
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Michigan Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 235 N.W.2d 769, 777 (Mich. Ct. App.
1975); see also supra notes 237-44 and accompanying text (discussing the preclusive effect
that the Michigan Court of Appeals granted consent judgments).
248, See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 388 (1996) (Gins-
burg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the remand should be for
the purpose of allowing the lower court to address Delaware preclusion law); Migra v.
Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 87 (1984) (remanding so that the federal
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Another formulation of Justice Kennedy's first step approach seems to
present an even easier answer to the Baker case. By summarizing Justice
Kennedy's first step analysis with an equation, No Claim Preclusion + No
Issue Preclusion = No Full Faith and Credit, this Article's intention is to
emphasize the importance of F-l's law of preclusion. However, the
equation also embodies the essence of the relationship between all com-
mon law preclusion principles and full faith and credit. If the assertion of
the F-1 judgment in F-2 creates no opportunity to end the litigation
through claim or issue preclusion, because, for example, the F-2 parties
are not the same as the F-1 parties, there simply is no full faith and credit
question. Full faith and credit has never been used as a means to man-
date controlling precedent from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.4 9
It seems reasonable to conclude, however, that by reaching the consti-
tutional question on the scope of full faith and credit where "mere ef-
fects" of a judgment are asserted, the Supreme Court is signaling the im-
portant, constitutional nature of its limitation on full faith and credit.
Although it does not use the phrase "due process" as the source of the
limitation on full faith and credit for judgments, the majority decision in
Baker v. General Motors nonetheless identifies an analogous limitation
on interjurisdictional enforcement of judgments. As discussed in Part
V.C, below, Justice Ginsburg's limitation on full faith and credit func-
tions in much the same manner as does the due process limitation on res
judicata seen in Richards v. Jefferson County.
C. The Unaddressed Question: Why Not Due Process?
* In its opinion, the Supreme Court seems to ignore the central due pro-cessarguent f th " 251
cess argument of the Bakers. Yet, the due process challenge appeared
district court could apply Ohio preclusion law).
249. A more disturbing possibility would be that the majority, by addressing General
Motors's contention, envisioned instances where full faith and credit would require "en-
forcement" of the mere effects of a judgment against nonparties; for example, if such ef-
fects were deemed minimal. Such a conclusion, however, appears inconsistent with the
distinction the Court made between full faith and credit for common law and judgments,
and would appear to confuse common law preclusion by judgment with the common law
doctrine of stare decisis. See supra notes 48-151 and accompanying text (addressing the
Court's treatment of consent and litigated judgments for preclusion purposes). In this re-
spect, Justice Kennedy seems justified in his concern that there is no reason to reach the
full faith and credit issue if the rendering court would not assign claim or issue preclusion
to the judgment in question. "Mere effects" generated by a prior decision do not appear
to require enforcement under the full faith and credit command, regardless of their benign
nature.
250. 517 U.S. 793 (1996); see infra Part V.C (discussing case in detail).
251. See supra Part IV (discussing the functioning of full faith and credit principles, as
understood by Justice Ginsberg).
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to have been invited by the reasoning of two recent cases addressing the
effects of consent judgments: the majority decision in Martin v. Wilks,
252
and Justice Ginsburg's own partial concurring opinion in Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co. v. Epstein.53 In Wilks, the Supreme Court held
that white firefighters were not precluded from asserting the discrimina-
tory impact of their employer's decisions made in reliance on a consent
decree that had settled a prior discrimination suit by black firefighters.254
With this decision, the Supreme Court put an end to a judicially fash-
ioned "collateral attack bar". relied on by the majority of federal circuits
as the basis to restrict review of consent decrees in public interest litiga-
tion. Although it did not use the phrase "due process" or cite a specific
constitutional amendment,256 the majority made the following observa-
tion:
All agree that "[i]t is a principle of general application in
Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a
judgment in personam in a litigation in which he is not desig-
nated as a party or to which he has not been made a party by
service of process." This rule is part of our "deep-rooted his-
toric tradition that everyone should have his own day in court."
A judgment or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues
as among them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers
to those proceedings.257
In Wilks, the Court contrasted the consent decree at issue with other
252. 490 U.S. 755, 758 (1989).
253. 516 U.S. 367, 388 (1996) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
see also Blonder-Tongue Labs. v. University of Illinois Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971)
(holding that due process prohibits estopping litigants from going forward); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 108-12 (1969) (holding a company was not
bound by a judgment resulting from litigation to which the company was not a party).
254. The holding in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989), has been superseded by leg-
islation amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 to restrict "collateral" attack on consent decrees in
employment discrimination cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (1994).
255. See generally John 0. McGinnis, The Bar Against Challenges to Employment Dis-
crimination Consent Decrees: A Public Choice Perspective, 54 LA. L. REV. 1507 (1994)
(analyzing the impact of the common law collateral attack bar in Title VII cases); Susan B.
Dorfman, Comment, Mandatory Consent: Binding Unrepresented Third Parties Through
Consent Decrees, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 153, 156-60 (1994) (addressing the problems inherent
in trying to enforce consent decrees against third parties and providing proposed solu-
tions).
256. The majority opinion was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist. See Wilks, 490
U.S. at 758. Compare Chief Justice Rehnquist's remarks during oral argument in Baker,
discussed supra at note 195.
257. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 761-62 (citations omitted) (quoting Hansbury v. Lee, 311 U.S.
32, 40 (1940); 18 CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ET AL. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §
4449, at 417 (1981)).
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"special remedial scheme[s]" which "expressly [foreclose] successive liti-
gation by nonlitigants, as for example in bankruptcy or probate," noting
that in such instances "legal proceedings may terminate preexisting rights
if the scheme is otherwise consistent with due process." '258
By comparison, in Matsushita, a Delaware state court judgment that
had been used to settle a shareholders' suit based on state and federal
laws was held to act as a bar to a separate federal suit by another group
of shareholders. 9 While it may be tempting to read the Matsushita re-
sult as a declaration that consent judgments will be given the same broad
full faith and credit as litigated judgments, a more cautious reading sug-
gests the Court's reason for giving preclusive effect to the state consent
judgment depended heavily on the judicial supervision of the class action
certification process.26 ° The Court viewed the class certification review
conducted by the lower federal court as providing appropriate protec-
tions to "absent" shareholders who thus were held to be barred from
separate suit by the first outcome.261 The Delaware court's role in certi-
fying the class for settlement was far more than a rubber stamp on a con-
tract. Justice Ginsburg, writing separately, specifically cautioned against
reading the majority's willingness to give preclusive effects to the state
court judgment too broadly: "A state-court judgment generally is not en-
titled to full faith and credit unless it satisfies the requirements of the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause."2 62
In truth, however, the Supreme Court did not so much ignore the due
process argument in Baker as it side-stepped it. During oral argument, it
became apparent early that the Court was not disposed to adopt the due
process analysis urged by the Bakers in their briefs. Justice Kennedy in-
quired of Professor Tribe,
If we were to rule in your favor and cite the Full Faith and
Credit Clause, would we also have to talk about due process, or
would we say that the Full Faith and Credit Clause is comple-
mentary to the basic principles of the law of judgments, and that
Baker is just not bound under standard principles of the laws of
258. Wilks, 490 U.S. at 762 n.2.
259. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 369 (1996).
260. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997) (Ginsburg, J.)
(holding settlement to be a relevant factor in reviewing class certification under Rule 23,
finding federal courts may not ignore Rule 23 and adopt their own standard of approval
based on "fairness" of settlements, and reversing class certification because of failure to
satisfy criteria of Rule 23).
261. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 377-78.





In an exchange a few moments later, Chief Justice Rehnquist followed
with the observation that "I don't think you'll find much disposition on
the Court to enlarge on [the due process implications of] Logan v. Zim-
merman."264 Laurence Tribe began a pragmatic retreat from the due pro-
cess focus of the brief, a decision which was reinforced by the observa-
tion of Justice Ginsburg: "Mr. Tribe, I thought . . . you were
concentrating on preclusion principles rather than a due process personal
right. ,,265
On one level, Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co.266 appears highly rele-
vant to the Bakers' concerns. In 1982, the Supreme Court recognized
that a "cause of action is a species of property" and that a party's right to
pursue such an action is subject to the protections of the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Court traditionally has held that the Due Process
Clauses protect civil litigants who seek recourse in the courts,
either as defendants hoping to protect their property or as
plaintiffs attempting to redress grievances. . . .Similarly, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has been inter-
preted as preventing the States from denying potential litigants
use of established adjudicatory procedures, when such an action
would be "the equivalent of denying them an opportunity to be
heard upon their claimed right[s]. ' 2
At issue in Zimmerman was a disabled employee's right to have a state
administrative grievance hearing when, through no fault of the em-
ployee, the state failed to schedule the hearing within a 120-day statutory
window. In the lead opinion, written by Justice Blackmun, the Court
concluded that a "state-created right to redress discrimination" was a
protected property right.269
In a separate opinion concurring in the judgment of Zimmerman, Jus-
tice Powell, joined by Justice Rehnquist, admonished the majority, citing
the dangers of resolving the case on due process grounds.270 It may be
263. Id. at 14.
264. Id. at 16 (making reference to Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S 422
(1982)).
265. Transcript, supra note 2, at 19-20.
266. 455 U.S. 422 (1982).
267. See id. at 428 (citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950)).
268. Id. at 429-30 (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380 (1971)).
269. Id. at 431.
270. See id. at 443 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).
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tempting to explain the Supreme Court's unwillingness to extend Zim-
merman as a reflection of the conservative nature of the more recent Su-
preme Court.7
Blaming the change on the political composition of the Court, how-
ever, is an overly simplistic answer. Indeed, in 1996, the Supreme Court
was unanimous in holding that due process was the source of the limita-
tion on a court's ability to use a judgment to bind new challengers.272
In Richards v. Jefferson County, the Court found that application of
res judicata, arising from a prior court decision on the constitutionality of
a county occupation tax, was unconstitutional when applied to "new"
challengers. The Court cited the same line of due process/jurisdictional
274cases used by Justice Blackmun in deciding Zimmerman.
State courts are generally free to develop their own rules for
protecting against the relitigation of common issues or the
piecemeal resolution of disputes. We have long held, however,
that extreme applications of the doctrine of res judicata may be
inconsistent with a federal right that is "fundamental in charac-
ter."
The limits on a state court's power to develop estoppel rules
reflect the general consensus "'in Anglo-American jurispru-
dence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam in a liti-
gation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he
has not been made a party by service of process.' This rule is
part of our 'deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should
have his own day in court."' As a consequence, "[a] judgment
or decree among parties to a lawsuit resolves issues as among
them, but it does not conclude the rights of strangers to those
It is necessary for this Court to decide cases during almost every Term on due
process and equal protection grounds. Our opinions in these areas are often
criticized, with justice, as lacking consistency and clarity. Because these issues
arise in varied settings, and opinions are written by each of nine Justices, consis-
tency of language is an ideal unlikely to be achieved. Yet I suppose we would all
agree-at least in theory-that unnecessarily broad statements of doctrine fre-
quently do more to confuse than to clarify our jurisprudence.
Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
271. See Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking In A Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185,
1198 (1992) ("Doctrinal limbs too swiftly shaped, experience teaches, may prove unsta-
ble."). See generally Susan N. Herman, The New Liberty: The Procedural Due Process
Rights of Prisoners and Others Under the Burger Court, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 482 (1984)
(tracking the development of the "Burger Court's" positivist theory of property rights).
272. See Richards v. Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 802 (1996).
273. 517 U.S. 793 (1996).
274. See id. at 798-805 (citing Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982);






Interestingly, aspects of this same analysis appear in the majority
opinion of Baker v. General Motors.76 The distinction between the due
process analytical approaches used in Zimmerman and Richards and the
section 103 approach of Ginsburg's majority in Baker v. General Motors
appears to be the Court's response to the interest at risk. In Zimmer-
man, the state denied a hearing on employment rights, which had been
created by statutory process; in Richards, the hearing was also employ-
ment-related, and was for the purpose of determining the constitutional-
ity of an occupancy tax imposed on private but not public workers. As
such, both suits fell within fairly well-settled areas of protected "funda-
mental" property rights. Apparently, the Supreme Court was unwilling,
or Justice Ginsburg could not command enough votes, to use the occa-
sion of Baker v. General Motors to imply, much less declare, that the
plaintiffs' interest in calling a specific witness at deposition or trial was
the equivalent of a fundamental, individual right. As one commentator
has observed,
[t]he difficulty in whistleblower proceedings is that unlike
the petitioner in Logan, a whistleblower is not denied access to
the cause of action itself. Therefore, if the cause of action is the
property interest, there may be no deprivation in a whistle-
blower case because the suit may proceed without the subpoena
277power.
Thus, the majority decision in Baker v. General Motors should be seen
as important both for the fact that it does recognize a policy limitation,
apparently based on the Constitution , on the application of full faith and
credit to enforce "meddling" judgments, and because the justices did not
choose to identify due process as the source of this constitutional limita-
tion. Presumably, there may be some judgments that have permissible
"effects" on third persons and which must be enforced under full faith
and credit because the judgments neither impair fundamental individual
rights, nor interfere with important national policy interests, such as the
nation-wide obligation of courts to determine individual claims. Matsu-
shita may be an example of the case in the middle, where the absent per-
271sons' interests are viewed as protected by the class certification process.
Many consent judgments, however, receive little, if any, judicial consid-
275. Richards, 517 U.S. at 797-98 (citations and footnote omitted).
276. See Baker v. General Motors Corp. 118 S. Ct. 657, 666 n.11 (1998).
277. Stephen E. Smith, Due Process and the Subpoena Power in Federal Environ-
mental, Health, and Safety Whistleblower Proceedings, 32 U.S.F. L. REV. 533, 540 (1998).
278. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 377-78 (1996).
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eration of the merits and offer ripe opportunities for F-1 parties to seek
advantage in F-2 suits.
VI. CONCLUSION: LIMITATIONS EXIST ON INTERJURISDICTIONAL
"EFFECTS" OF JUDGMENTS, ESPECIALLY CONSENT JUDGMENTS
In attempting to resolve the various approaches to full faith and credit,
one conclusion is paramount. The recent characterization of full faith
and credit as the "iron law," which appears to have influenced the posi-
tions of GM and the Eighth Circuit, and which is helpful in describing the
credit generally given to judgments, should not be treated as an excuse
for oversimplification. As demonstrated by the Court in Baker v. Gen-
eral Motors, the full faith and credit command is not a mechanical rule
requiring the courts to "enforce" a judgment while ignoring the implica-
tions of that judgment for specific individuals, or for the judicial system.
Given the recent frequency with which difficult interjurisdictional en-
forcement questions have arisen in the context of consent judgments,"9
requiring the Court to craft carefully worded limitations on full faith and
credit, perhaps there is need to reconsider the underlying assumption
that full faith and credit should apply equally to litigated and consensual
final decrees. Consent judgments are useful devices, but, as in other in-
stances in which there is a lack of "judicial" fact finding and legal evalua-
280tion, perhaps there is good reason not to elevate such decrees to the
status of "judicial proceedings" that are presumptively entitled to inter-
jurisdictional enforcement. Eventually, the Supreme Court may be re-
quired to reconsider its assumptions about full faith and credit for con-
sent decrees. 8 In the meantime, as a factual, if not legal matter, the
appropriate maxim for litigation attorneys contemplating settlement by
consent judgment should be: caveat emptor, buyer beware.
279. See Baker, 118 S. Ct. at 657; Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 367; Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S.
755 (1989).
280. See supra note 172 (discussing unconfirmed arbitration awards).
281. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Nelson, 11 F. Supp. 2d 572, 579-80
(D.N.J. 1998) (declining to follow Baker on the ground that the consent decree involved in
Nelson applied only to privileged information; therefore, third parties would not have had
access to it in the first place).
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